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All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection,




This article argues that although Brown v. Board of Education Iis in
some respects a spent force as a vehicle for achieving racial integration in
the schools2 and no longer reflects a consensus in the black community
on the value of racial integration and the harm of separation, its conclu-
sion that separate can never be equal remains valid for blacks as well as
whites.' Further, it represents a yardstick by which America measures
its progress towards a just society.
The all-male black schools (AMBSs) are based on two premises;
that young black males need a special, exclusively black educational envi-
ronment to survive, and that the curriculum of such an institution pro-
viding that educational environment should be Afrocentric. The
proponents of the AMBS argue for its constitutionality on the grounds
that the segregation involved is voluntary self-segregation and not a seg-
regation required by law, and that because young black males have suf-
fered inordinately in American society and require special treatment to
remedy this plight, they can, as a class, be treated differently from whites,
and females (both white and black).
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Formerly of the Faculty of Law of
The Haile Sellassie I University, Ethiopia and The University of the West Indies, Cave Hill,
Barbados. The author wishes to thank Dr. Kenneth Clark and Mr. Michael Meyers, New
York Civil Rights Coalition, and Mr. Walter W. Morrison, Director, Department of Research,
NAACP, for their cooperation in the researching and writing of this article. He also wishes to
thank his research assistant, Mr. Matthew Horn, for his extensive efforts in locating cases and
materials essential for its completion.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1453 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (At some
time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume without any further proof,
that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President,
or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current operation of schools. We are
close to that time.").
3. But see Pamela J. Smith, Comment, .4ll Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REv. 2003, 2012-15 (1992).
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The proponents of the AMBSs are referred to in this article as the
"New Separatists," the post-modem anti-integrationists, who as the re-
suit of disillusionment with the promises of a truly interracial society,
have sought to find solutions through the established constitutional order
that legitimize separate educational institutions based on race and gen-
der. They differ from the "Old Separatists" by their commitment to con-
stitutional means to achieve the changes they consider essential for the
survival of young black males. By working within the system, they af-
firm the American constitutional tradition while challenging the current
application of its recognized doctrines. Yet while their commitment to
the constitutional process and their sincerity are to be applauded, their
conclusions must be eschewed.
Specifically, even if racial segregation of blacks is voluntary, as it is
in AMBSs, it is still harmful. The "sanction of the law" standard of
Brown4 can be eliminated with its holding still intact. Further, gender
based discrimination's "heightened scrutiny"5 standard, beyond the sim-
ple "rational basis" test, is applicable to AMBSs because women are at
least a semi-suspect class. Women in general, and black women in par-
ticular, resemble blacks as a class because of the history of discrimination
against them. The "heightened scrutiny" standard for gender based dis-
crimination, inspired in its development by Brown, now renders exclu-
sion of women, both black and white, from the AMBS an unsustainable
violation of equal protection.
The concept of AMBSs arose as a solution to the alienation of inner-
city young black males. Some African-American educators are calling
for the creation of all-male black schools (AMBSs) with all-black, all-
male teachers 6-- an anathema to integrationist doctrine. Equal protec-
tion in post-liberal America defies easy analysis, as questions of identity
and self-worth cloud any attempt to posit a simple solution to race rela-
tions in a society in constant flux.
This article considers the proposed plan in Detroit for AMBSs and
the court decision in the Detroit case that entertained a challenge to
them. There is an attempt in this decision to reconcile the laudable ob-
4. "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law." Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (quoting with approval a finding of the Kan-
sas case.). See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
5. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (adhering an
intermediate level of scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Fronterio v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
6. See Patricia A. Jones, Educating Black Males-Several Solutions, 98 Caisis, Oct.
1991, at 12; Smith, supra note 3, at 2005. Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, Baltimore, and the
District of Columbia all have school boards that have proposed such schools. Id at 2006.
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jective of saving of young black males who are increasingly threatened by
the violent world in which they are forced to live, with constitutional
requirements and the demands of those within the black community who
oppose the plan. Ultimately, the decision, while emphasizing established
equal protection approaches, calls for compromise to effectuate a better
public educational system for all.
It is not possible to understand the Detroit decision without an ex-
amination of equal protection doctrine, particularly as it applies to gen-
der. In doing this, the article considers the important development of the
"heightened scrutiny" standard in gender cases, relating this to the vari-
ous plans for AMBSs around the country. The argument that black wo-
men are themselves a special class which gives rise to a new standard that
constitutes a combination of both strict and heightened scrutiny is con-
sidered as a cogent argument against the AMBSs.
Further, this article considers Brown's progeny, showing the original
decision's continued vitality, notwithstanding efforts to redefine its con-
tours. In doing so, this article concludes that the decision in Brown has
been elevated to an exalted place in American jurisprudence by virtue of
both the compelling empirical evidence on which it rests and the clear
and self-evident principles that led to the end of sanctioned educational
segregation.
There is, in this approach, a dichotomy of race relations that is con-
sidered in the article, with the bi-polar realities being integration and
separatism. The article considers competing social theories, including
those dealing with the value of empirical data in the constitutional deci-
sion-making process and the role of natural law, as an inherent part of its
analysis of constitutional doctrine. In coming down in favor of integra-
tion, this article points towards a reconciliation of opposites and the need
for racial unity as the foundations for a democratic society.
This article was conceived just prior to the time of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's death. That it should appear in a volume dedicated to his
memory emphasizes the significance of the issues raised in it. To a great
extent, the real issue is the legacy of the two Marshalls. Is the purpose of
judicial review the enunciation of abstract principles unrelated to reality
or is it the dynamic creation of a constitutional structure that works?
John Marshall believed the latter, for as he said in Gibbons v. Ogden7 in
his legendary attack on Jefferson:
[Powerful] and ingenious minds, taking as postulates, that the
powers expressly granted to the government of the Union, are to be
contracted, by construction, into the narrowest possible compass,
7. 9 Wheat. (22 U.S. 1) (1823).
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and that the original powers of the states are retained, if any possi-
ble construction will retain them, may, by a course of weli di-
gested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these
premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave
it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for
use.8
Thurgood Marshall, who argued Brown on behalf of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund positioned himself in the tradition of John Marshall.
He argued that if a nation could not exists, in the words of Lincoln, "half
slave and half free," it could not, ultimately, exist first class and second
class. The decision in Brown, this article suggests, affirmed that argu-
ment and rested primarily on the kind of structural pragmatism John
Marshall called for in his philosophy of interpretation. One rejects this
approach at one's peril,9 for it leads to a fragmentation that undermines
the nation's vitality, a fragmentation that one hoped had been left in the
dust of the Civil War.
I. The Relevance of Social Science in Brown
The basic question the Court postulated in Brown was: "Does segre-
gation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportu-
nities?"1 To this question, the Court responded tersely: "We believe
that it does."11
Chief Justice Warren's use of the word "believe" lies at the heart of
the difficulty with the decision. "Belief" connotes an act of faith, an affir-
mation of something that is not verifiable by empirical evidence, but
which transcends the senses through an existential commitment. It is a
distinctly non-legal, even an unlegal, term. That segregated schools are
damaging to black children is either true or it is not, just as there was a
virgin birth or there was not, just as Galileo was right that the earth
revolved around the sun, or he was not, and the sun revolved around the
earth. Although this is a matter of empirical substantiation, the Court
attempted to escape the conundrum by arguing that "separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal.' 1 2 Something that is "inherently
8d. at 4.
9. But see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, REPRESENTA-
TIONS, Spr. 1990, at 1162-89 (Univ. of Cal. Press) (arguing that judicial review is an invention
of the Federalists to protect private property).
10. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
11. Id.
12. Id at 495.
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unequal" is not so because of empirical data, but because of its very na-
ture, known through pure reason.' 3
In wrestling with the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 4 the Court relied heavily on McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gentsfor HigherEduc.,Is a case that involved the almost total isolation of
a black graduate student while he pursued his studies in a separate facil-
ity. In segregated all-black schools, black students were not isolated,
only separated from whites. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion, quoting from Chief Justice Vinson, emphasized the "ability to study,
to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn the profession."' 6 It continued:
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade
and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.17
Arguing that segregation sanctioned by the law exerts a greater im-
pact due to the sense of inferiority instilled in black children, Chief Jus-
tice Warren relied on the language of the Kansas case: "A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."' 8
Discarding the "separate but equal" standard of Plessy,'9 Chief Justice
Warren concluded: "Whatever may have been the extent of psychologi-
cal knowledge at the time of Plessy, this finding is amply supported by
modem authority. '20 It is here that Chief Justice Warren turned finally
in his famous footnote 11 to ostensibly empirical justification for his
conclusions. 21
13. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 91, Third Article, passim.
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc.)
14. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
15, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641).
17. I. at 494.
18. Id (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 799 (1951)).
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. Id. at 494-95.
21. Id at 494 n. 11. The footnote cited KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE ON
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950) (Midcentury White House Conf. on Children and
Youth); WITMER & KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING, ch. VI (1950); Deutscher &
Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion,
26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Chein, Fat are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under
Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE REs. 229 (1949); Brameld,
EDUCATIONAL COSTS, IN Discrimination and National Welfare 44-48 (MacIver, ed., 1949);
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Brown was not the first case in which the Court relied on modem
social science. The findings of Deutscher and Chein were cited in the
Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General's brief in Henderson v.
United States,2 2 a 1950 case involving the segregation of an African
American on a railroad in interstate commerce. This study was also
cited in the social science appendix submitted to the Supreme Court in
the segregated schools cases, 23 and was, in turn, cited in Chief Justice
Warren's footnote 11.24
Deutscher and Chein based their findings on data received from five
hundred social scientists, including anthropologists, sociologists, and so-
cial psychologists, who had done research in the field of race relations.2"
According to Dr. Kenneth Clark, "[t]he investigators found that 90 per-
cent of the social scientists who replied believed that segregation has bad
psychological effects on members of the segregated group, even if equal
facilities are provided."' 26 The specific detrimental effects on members of
the minority group were described as follows:
1. Segregation puts special burdens upon members of a minority
group by the clear discrepancy between democratic ideals and the
actual practice of enforced segregation.
2. Segregation is a special source of frustration for persons who
are segregated.
3. Segregation leads to feelings of inferiority and of not being
wanted.
4. Segregation leads to feelings of submissiveness, martyrdom,
aggressiveness, withdrawal tendencies, and conflicts about the indi-
vidual's worth.
5. Segregation leads to a distortion in the sense of what is real.27
As these traits are emphasized, a vicious cycle is created, some of the
social scientists argued; the harmful personality patterns caused by segre-
gation become reasons for legitimizing segregation.28 African-American
children react "to an awareness of their inferior racial status by escape
and the conscious search for revenge."12 9
But blacks are not the only group harmed by segregation, the social
Frazier, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-81, (1949). See generally MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
22. 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
23. KENNTH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 41 (2nd ed. Beacon Press 1963)
[hereinafter CLARK, PREJUDICE].
24. See supra note 21.
25. CLARK, PREJUDICE, supra note 23, at 39.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 39.
28. Id. at 40.
29. Id. at 42.
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scientists concluded.3" Whites suffer as well by virtue of their depriva-
tion. Deutscher and Chein determined that eighty-three percent of the
social scientists maintained that racial segregation "has detrimental psy-
chological effects on members of the privileged group. ' 31 Dr. Clark sum-
marized these findings with regard to whites:
1. Segregation is a symptom of some psychological maladjust-
ment in those who demand segregation.
2. There are pervasive and elusive harmful effects of segregation
on members of the majority group-increased hostility, deteriora-
tion of moral values, the hardening of social sensitivity, conflict
between ideology and practices, the development of rationaliza-
tions and other techniques for protecting one's self.
3. Segregation results in inner conflicts and guilt feelings among
members of the group enforcing segregation.
4. Segregation leads to disturbances in the individual's sense of
reality and the relation of the individual to the world around
him. 3 2
Clark accepted moral judgments as an inherent part of social science
research, urging as one of the major goals of the social sciences "a search
for description and verification of moral laws.",33 As social psychologist
Theodore Newcomb wrote:
Medical research is not hampered by the assumptions that pain
and disease are bad. Prejudice and discrimination are also bad. By
directing our research to the practical end of eliminating them, I
think we may find out not only that our research is better, but also
that we have moved from illusion toward social reality.34
But have we? When terms such as "believe" or "moral judgments"
are employed, we are in the realm of belief systems, not science. It could
be argued that integrationist observers in the social sciences should not
indulge their own preconceptions of what is right and wrong, even if
those preconceptions may strike a majority as just. These preconcep-
tions, it might be argued, lead to the avoidance of the question of
whether there is anything of inherent worth in blackness outside of an
integration context. Likewise, by implication, it dismisses an inquiry into
the beneficial effects of African Americans identifying with African
Americans without having to endure the pressures at an early age of con-
forming to a Caucasian-American dominant culture. This is not to con-
clude that the public financing of schools that provide this environment
30. Ia at 40.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id. at 38.
34. Theodore M. Newcomb, Autistic Hostility and Social Reality, I HUM. REL. 69-86
(1949).
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is constitutional; that remains to be evaluated. But while it is not the
purpose of this article to rehash all the criticism of the social science
evidence that followed Brown, 5 it is within its purview to suggest that
the language of the social sciences used to overturn the "separate but
equal" doctrine with regard to race must be considered a product of the
liberal, integrationist structures that dominated the culture at the time of
the decision, as well as the unconscious structures in the minds of the
"Negro" Americans of that generation.36
HI. The Pain of Prejudice
There is no more powerful exploration of those structures in Ameri-
can literature than Richard Wright's Native Son.37 The image of Bigger
Thomas, whether killing a giant rat in the housing project or raping
Mary, the white woman whom he later killed, elicits outrage and fear.
The terror evoked by Thomas as he waited on Death Row, explaining
why he killed, along with the lynching in Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit,38
had by the 1950s generated a latent sense of outrage among many whites
about the condition of American blacks across the country, including
among progressive white circles in the South.39 As is so often the case in
the American constitutional process, the moral law preceded the consti-
tutional law, which is why the novels were written before the court deci-
sions. Long before the findings of the social scientists, Richard Wright
wrote in the voice of Bigger Thomas's defense attorney:
35. See generally Edmund Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955); Kenneth
B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientists Role, 5 VILL. L. REv. 224
(1959) [hereinafter Clark, The Desegregation Cases]; Kenneth B. Clark, The Social Scientists,
the Brown Decision and Contemporary Confusion, in ARGUMENT (Friedman ed., 1969); The
Courts, Social Science; and School Desegregation, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1975).
36. See generally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, ANTHROPOLOGIE STRUCTURALE (1955); see
also KURZWELL, THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM (1980) noting that:
The basic premise of Levis-Strauss' approach is contrary to most American systems
theories, which tend to deal with observable data and to ignore unconscious struc-
tures of mind. Second, the French use of the term 'scientific' is not linked to empiri-
cal proof in the same way as its American equivalent is. Third, French writers
traditionally have brought personal experiences to their interpretation of history.
Together, these intellectual habits have generated a highly allusive form of discourse
which allows for many divergent interpretations of Levi-Strauss' original theories.
37. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATiVE SON (Harper Perennial 1992) (1944).
38. LILLIAN SMITH, STRANGE FRUIT (1948). The title, "Strange Fruit," was taken from
the Billie Holiday song of the same name. BILLIE HOLIDAY, STRANGE FRUIT (Edward B.
Marks Music Co. 1940) (written by Lewis Allan) "Southern trees bear a strange fruit, blood on
the leaves and blood on the root. Black body swaying in the Southern breeze; strange fruit
hanging from the poplar trees." Id.
39. See DAVID J. GARRow, BEARING THE CROSS-MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 12-125 (Vintage Books 1988);
HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED 32-77 (Penguin Books 1983) (1978).
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The hate and fear which we have inspired in him, woven by
our civilization into the very structure of his consciousness, into his
blood and bones, into the hourly functioning of his personality,
have become the justification of his existence.
Every time he comes in contact with us, he kills! It is a physi-
ological and psychological reaction, embedded in his being. Every
thought he thinks is potential murder. Excluded from, and unas-
similated in our society, yet longing to gratify impulses akin to our
own but denied the objects and channels evolved through long cen-
turies for their socialized expression, every sunrise and sunset
make him guilty of subversive actions. Every movement of his
body is an unconscious protest. Every desire, every dream, no
matter how intimate or personal, is a plot or a conspiracy. Every
hope is a plan for insurrection. Every glance of the eye is a threat.
His very existence is a crime against the state 40
If this society had not moved to rectify these outrages, surely the
constitutional order itself would have been threatened. America's fabled
"conspiratorial imagination" 41 could perceive the very revolutionary po-
tential that Wright wanted it to see, a cancer eating away at the society,
weakening it and rendering it vulnerable to unacceptable doctrines and
personalities. But the legal strategies to integrate the southern schools
failed to take into consideration the northern American cities with their
urban decay, their vast dehumanized housing projects, and their devas-
tated economies-the world of the Bigger Thomases. To some, there
would inevitably have to be a choice between two prophets: Martin Lu-
ther King and Malcolm X.
I. The Reality of Segregation
The image of the Civil Rights Movement in Brown is integrationist,
the "dream" of Dr. King42 that blacks and whites would study and even-
tually live together in a common culture in which everyone was accepted
as equal.43 But the "integration" of this strategy was one of assimilation
into the white world, presupposing that it was worth integrating into. In
this pre-multicultural society, there was only one valid culture: the
bland, homogenized, assimilationist culture in which humans were pri-
marily consumers. Everyone was obliged to fit in or be discarded. The
only black American to be offered a show of his own on television in the
fifties was the legendary Nat "King" Cole, whose easy going, non-threat-
40. WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 366-67.
41. See Sanford Pinsker, America's Conspiratorial Imagination, 68 VA. Q. REv. (1992).
42. GARROW, supra note 39, at 283-84 (relating Dr. King's "I have a dream speech"
during the Washington march in 1963).
43. Id.
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ening manner could still not get him a sponsor.' Southern whites ob-
jected to the show and it was canceled. Segregationist whites' underlying
fear of sexual contamination by blacks could not be overcome even by
non-threatening entertainers such as Cole.41 Segregation in the schools
was simply an instrument of total separation with African Americans
subjected to a situation of permanent inferiority, an inferiority that was
regarded as "inherent" and not environmental." The "invisibility" of
African-Americans in the pre-Brown society was a universal condition
that denied to them the "equal protection of the laws."4
IV. Types of Segregation
Pamela J. Smith, in her cogent comment, All-Male Black Schools
and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education,4"
argued that Brown "did not attack mere separation of the races, but de
jure segregation., 49 Education itself is not a constitutional right recog-
44. COLOR ADJUSTMENT (1991) (film by Marlon Riggs).
45. See WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 76-77 (1968):
For the black man, the white woman represents the socially identified female idea
and thus an intensely exciting object of his sexual possession. She has been identified
as precisely the individual to whom access is barred by every social institution. The
forbiddeness and desirableness of the white woman make her a natural recipient of
his projected oedipal fantasies. He sees himself as finally possessing the material
object under circumstances which reproduce the dangerous defiant quality of oedipal
interest as experienced by the child. He feels a sense of power at having acquired this
highly valuable woman and a sense of power that she finds him desirable and indeed
that she finds him more desirable than a white lover. But at the same time he per-
ceives her as white and as a representative of all the white oppressors who have made
his life so wretched. In a sense then, she becomes the target for a hatred which far
transcends the encounter between this man and this woman.
This would appear to be an exaggeration, nevertheless, it is not an inaccurate description of a
white racist's perception.
46. For a vivid description of a child growing up in a totally segregated America, see
RICHARD WRIGr, BLACK BOY (Harper and Row 1945). For the argument that racial differ-
ences in ability are biologically rooted, see NORMAN J. ITZKOFF, THE ROAD TO EQUALITY:
EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL REALITY (1992). Itzkoff's solution is to encourage the highly intelli-
gent to have more children and the less intelligent to have fewer. On the other side, arguing
that environment is responsible for a person's ability, see JOHN R. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM
(1925), the work that influenced B.F. Skinner and the Behaviorist school. The "nature" versus
"nurture" argument has produced a synthesis in most social psychological analysis that both
are of equal importance. See Stacey Schmeidel, The Implications of Choosing Sides, NnwSs-
MrrH, Fall 1992, at 7.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws"); see generally RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (Random
House 1952).
48. Smith, supra note 3.
49. Id. at 2009; See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
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nized by the Supreme Court, 0 but once a state creates a system of educa-
tion, it cannot avoid the consequences of violating constitutional
standards deemed applicable by the Supreme Court.51 Thus the Court in
Brown, in analyzing the data before it, concluded that the forced segrega-
tion by law of African-American students violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the schools provided facili-
ties equal to those in every other way enjoyed by white students.5 2 The
"ultimate general principle"53 of Brown, "that a State may not constitu-
tionally require segregation of public facilities,"54 does not by itself re-
solve the question of the validity of de facto segregation. This leads to
Smith's basic premise that AMBSs are constitutional, and to the conclu-
sion that self-imposed separation for black males is beneficial.55 Both
Smith's premise and conclusion must be scrutinized.
The crux of Smith's argument is that, notwithstanding the decision
in Brown, because of white flight and segregated housing patterns-a pat-
tern she describes as "resegregation"-the majority of African-American
children attend public schools that are de facto segregated.56 With no
way to effectively provide most of these children with integrated educa-
tion, these predominantly black school districts must address themselves
to the realities facing the children they are responsible for educating.
The constitutionality of resegregated school districts, when combined
with the legitimization of local control, makes fundamental decisions
about those schools, including decisions about curriculum, teachers,
race, and sex of the students,57 unreviewable.
Relying on extensive social psychological research that runs counter
to the findings of Dr. Kenneth Clark, Smith concludes that only by al-
lowing African-American boys to find their identities in all-male black
schools can they, with the help of all-male black teachers as role models,
free themselves from the destructive patterns in their relationships with
their mothers and become self-sufficient and self-reliant men.58 After ex-
amining the existing case law, she concludes that segregation by sex is
also permissible as something beneficial to both male and female African
50. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
51. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
53. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 654 (12th ed. Foundation 1992).
54. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 495) (emphasis
added).
55. Smith, supra note 3.
56. Id at 2009.
57. Id.
58. Smith, supra note 3, at 2033.
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Americans. 9 This last assertion will be examined first in order to isolate
the race issue, to the extent to which that is possible.
V. Gender Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause
With regard to gender segregation, the "separate but equal" doc-
trine is alive and well, a phenomenon resulting from the consideration of
gender classification under the "new equal protection" as semi-suspect,
subject to a heightened, intermediate level of scrutiny.' ° The applicable
test in an educational context is two-pronged. The classification is first
scrutinized for purpose, which must be either compensatory or based on
appropriate "roles and abilities of males and females."61 The Court then
scrutinizes the means to ensure that a "direct, substantial relationship"
exists between the purpose of the classification and the means. The
means must be based on "reasoned analysis" and not "mechanical appli-
cation of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women."62 "Separate but equal" education for boys
and girls was upheld in Vorcheimer v. School Dist.,63 and more recently,
that standard was applied in United States v. Virginia," establishing that
the heightened scrutiny for gender classification is satisfied in education
as long as the separate but equal criterion is satisfied as well.
Smith relied heavily on the lower court decision in United States v.
Virginia6" which, in applying heightened scrutiny, allowed the pure gen-
der-discriminating all-male admissions policy of the state military insti-
tute to stand because "the exclusion of women was substantially related
to the state's interest in providing that diverse education."66 The court
accepted the State's argument that allowing women to enroll would re-
quire substantial institutional changes and distract male students.67 It
relied on "an uncontested study regarding single-sex colleges,"68 which
concluded that "single-sex colleges provide better educational exper-
iences than coeducational institutions."69
59. Id. at 2047-48.
60. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
61. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
62. Id. at 726.
63. 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affid, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
64. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 19, 1993.
65. 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
66. Smith, supra note 3, at 2047; Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
67. I d (citing Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411-13).
68. Id
69. Id (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412). The court went on to state that:
Students of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty fre-
quently, show larger increases in intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with
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Smith argued that "the traditional gender discrimination test, with
all of its faults, is the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to the
exclusion of African-American females from the AMBS. ' '70 Relying on
Mississippi University for Woman v. Hogan,71 Smith explained that a gen-
der classification can pass constitutional muster if it is based on real dif-
ferences, or is designed to compensate one gender for past
discrimination.72 She concluded that the alleged purpose behind
AMBSs-putting an end to society's destruction of African-American
males by providing quality education to African-American boys-should
withstand intermediate scrutiny.73
At first blush, this analysis seems persuasive. As in Brown, there are
ample empirical analyses and sociological studies to rely on.74 And as in
Brown, there is a sincere desire to eliminate a long standing injustice.
But this is where the similarity ends. On the appeal in United States v.
Virginia, the Fourth Circuit stopped short of ordering the Virginia Mili-
tary Academy (VMI) to admit women and sent the case back to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings. 75 The court suggested that Virginia
"could satisfy the Constitution by establishing an all-female institution
similar to VMI, by admitting women to VMI, or by withdrawing state
support from VMI. '76 Lacking the benefit of the decision by the Fourth
Circuit, Smith concluded that the district court decision was the only
court that has "allowed pure gender discrimination in education. ' ' 77 Her
analysis of the decision at that level was unfortunately incomplete. The
Fourth Circuit noted that the issue was whether the unique benefit of-
fered by VMI's type of education could be denied to women under the
practically all aspects of college experience (the sole exception is social life) compared
with their counterparts in coeducational institutions. Attendance at an all-male col-
lege substantially increases the likelihood that a student will carry out career plans in
law, business and college teaching, and also has a substantial positive effect on start-
ing salaries in business. Women's colleges increase the chance that those attend will
obtain positions of leadership, complete the baccalaureate degree, and aspire to
higher degrees.
Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412.
70. Smith, supra note 3, at 2028.
71. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
72. Smith, supra note 3, at 2028-29.
73. Id. at 2030. Smith noted that the Hogan court was able to rely on nationwide statis-
tics in finding the university's purpose illegitimate because "geographic-specific statistics are
not required in gender classification cases as they are in the racial classification context." Id.
at 2029-30.
74. See supra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992).
76. Virginia Falters in Latest Battle to Protect All-Male Military College, 61 U.S.L.W.
1049 (1992).
77. Smith, supra note 1, at 2029.
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state's policy of diversity in education, which was advanced as the justifi-
cation for maintaining the system as it is. VMI's institutional mission
justified a single sex program, but the state did not reveal a policy that
explained why it offered the unique benefit of VMI's type of education
and training to men and not to women. The court concluded that:
VMI has adequately defended a single-gender education and train-
ing program to produce "citizen soldiers," it has not adequately
explained how the maintenance of one single-gender institution
gives effect to, or establishes the existence of, the governmental ob-
jective advanced to support VMI's admissions policy, a desire for
educational diversity."
In essence, what this means for AMBSs is that with regard to gen-
der discrimination, such schools are possible only if equal facilities are
also provided for black girls, white boys, and white girls so that every-
thing is in perfect balance: all-male black schools, all-female black
schools, all-male white schools, all-female white schools. This would re-
quire, in effect, four distinct school systems where there now is one, a
back-breaking financial burden that, if put in place on a wide scale,
would engender tax increases of monumental proportions. Cities already
reeling from the increased costs of services and reduced tax bases would
be strained beyond the breaking point to maintain a system that also
required four different teaching staffs, one all-male black, another all-
male white, one all-female black, another, all-female white. New school
buildings would have to be constructed to accommodate the new four-
way segregation. Who would pay?
Of course, the AMBSs are, in theory, to be located in those regions
experiencing resegregation, so that there would be two of everything, not
four. Yet two are still far more expensive than one.
Could separate still be equal as far as the African-American girls are
concerned? The very reasoning of Brown would come into play, only this
time from the point of view of black girls.
Smith rejected the theories of Professor Judy Scales-Trent, which
would have justified a different level of scrutiny in cases of discrimination
against African-American females and rendered the Brown approach ap-
plicable in the case of AMBSs with regard to African-American girls.
Professor Scales-Trent, in her challenging article, Black Women and the
Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights,7 9 argued that since
a black woman in America is discriminated against because of her race
and her gender, she is in both a suspect class by virtue of her race and a
78. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
79. Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting
Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989).
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quasi-suspect class because of her gender. 80 Her approach would require
that African-American women be given "more than strict scrutiny" be-
cause they are members at once of a suspect and a quasi-suspect class.81
Scales-Trent contended that this step is a logical extension of the Court's
equal protection framework but conceded that "it seems unlikely that the




All of Professor Scales-Trent's theories are premised on general so-
cietal discrimination against African American women. They do
not take into account intra-race gender discrimination. Between
African American men and women, as separate groups, race is not
a factor. The racial identification of both groups balances and min-
imizes any benefit the other would receive under a racial classifica-
tion. What is left, then, is gender classification. Accordingly, the
traditional gender discrimination test, with all of its faults, is the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to exclusion of African
American females from the AMBS.
Smith's acknowledgement that there is such a phenomenon as intra-
race discrimination based on gender-a phenomenon that was poign-
antly verified in Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings during
the testimony of Professor Anita Hill-raises the question of how to deal
with potential feelings of inferiority among African-American women at
being forcibly segregated by law from all-male all-black schools. While
Professor Scales-Trent's analysis did not include intra-race gender dis-
crimination, she cogently argued for a special recognition of the place of
African-American women in the constitutional system. This argument
paralleled that of Chief Justice Warren in Brown that the feeling of inferi-
ority of "Negroes" is engendered by forced segregation by law, com-
pounding the hardships already imposed on them by their place in
society.84 There can be no separation of black boys from black girls in
public schools without resentment that once again the African-American
80. Id. at 34.
81. Id at 34-35 (setting out her third theory). Her first two theories treated African-
American women as follows: The first treated African-American women as a subset of the
group labelled "women" or as a subset of the group labeled African-American. Id. at 24. The
second classified African-American women as a "discrete group seeking protection under the
Constitution." Id. While this second theory took into account "the historical degradation and
prejudice that has been perpetuated against African American women because of their race
and sex, as well as the historical and current political powerlessness of African American
women," Smith denied that it would have any impact with regard to AMBSs because black
males have suffered the same degradations. Smith, supra note 3, at 2023.
82. Scales-Trent, supra note 79, at 35.
83. Smith, supra note 3, at 2028.
84. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See also id. at 494 n. 11.
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female is getting the short end of the stick while the African-American
male is being coddled and given special treatment, including a special
Afrocentric curriculum."5 This was implicit in Scales-Trent's exposition
that equal protection requires yet another special class, that of black wo-
men. So while Smith and Scales-Trent each give us just one part of the
picture, together they lead to the conclusion that AMBSs do harm black
women and that unless there can be separate and equal facilities-a dubi-
ous possibility, given the shortage of funds and the inherent sense of in-
feriority that forced segregation engenders-the gender segregation of
African Americans is not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
As the National Organization of Women (NOW) Legal Defense and Ed-
ucation Fund has expressed it,
[w]hat is of great concern to women's equity advocates is the impli-
cation that it is the presence of females, rather than poor economic
and social conditions founded on RACE and sex discrimination,
which has led to the present failure of schools to educate the ma-
jority of children in this nation's urban schools. None of the pro-
posals for African-American male education have identified
whether and how specific curricula would address the historical
and present role and impact of African-American women. Nor
have they addressed what actions would be taken to mitigate the
kind of chauvinism which can emerge in any monocultural
environment.8 6
Further, there is the reality of role identification that an Afrocentric
curriculum would impose on both African-American boys and girls, if
that curriculum is historically and empirically accurate. Professor Ali A.
Mazrui,87 a noted African scholar, has described the political subordina-
tion of women in Africa. 8 Such political subordination means that an
85. See generally ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); JACQUELINE JONES,
LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW. BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM
SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); Linda Grant, Black Females' "Place" in Desegregated
Classrooms, 57 Soc. EDUC. 98 (1984).
86. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Public Education Programs for African
American Males: A Women's Educational Equity Policy Perspective, Apr., 1991 (working
draft) at 22. See generally, HULL, SCOTT, AND SMITH, ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL
THE BLACK ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN'S STUDIES (1982).
87. Research Professor at the University of Jos, Nigeria, and Professor of Political Science
and Afro-American and African Studies at the University of Michigan.
88. ALl A. MAZRUI, THE AFRICANS: A TRIPLE HERITAGE 129, 133 (1986) ("African
women have, on the whole, performed extremely poorly in sports compared with their male
counterparts. The demilitarization of women is the biggest cause for the marginalization of
women in sports and politics .... Class and gender have profoundly interacted in this particu-
lar division of labor."). See also Michael Meyers, Black Racism at Taxpayer Expense, WALL
ST. J., July 30, 1991, at A16:
Africanists, seeking to replace Eurocentrism with Afrocentrism, are substituting one
distortion with another. They claim to want to give minority students a curriculum
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"Afrocentric" curriculum, if it is accurate, will educate African-Ameri-
can boys to consider this subordination to be natural and to undervalue
African-American girls as equals. This result presents a further reason
for arguing that gender segregation among African Americans may be
harmful in much the same way that Dr. Kenneth Clark found enforced
segregation by race to be harmful to the self-esteem of African Ameri-
cans. 9 The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund has argued that
since "schools as a microcosm of the larger society tend to manifest all
forms of social inequality," all-male environments are likely to reproduce
and reinforce negative ideas about women.90
VI. The Proposed Programs for AMBSs and the
Emphasis on Race
The separation of African-American male students has been justified
on several grounds, giving rise to a variety of approaches. The first "fo-
cus[es] attention on the special needs of the African-American male
child" by separating male from female students.91 This, in essence, is the
approach adopted in both Milwaukee and Detroit. The Milwaukee task
force on the status of African-American males recommended changing
curriculum to include information on African-American culture along
with other cultures, and "establishing what it terms 'Gender Socializa-
tion Courses' which would be required for all students, designed to help
them establish gender in a 'safe' space."92
In San Diego, the school board has stressed "Improving the
Achievement of African Male Students."93 The board's goals include
improving students' academic skills, increasing attendance rates, high
school graduation rates and the number of students who meet college
that more accurately reflects these students' needs and aspirations-Afrocentric or
Africa-centered education. Africa, however, is not the source of all important ideas;
nor is it a place of "natural" kinship or identification for most Americans, blacks
included. We can and should include Africa in our global studies and in the review
of history, but we needn't use our classrooms or textbooks to give Africa mythologi-
cal properties, based on the alleged skin color of historical figures like Cleopatra and
the kings and queens of ancient times. Besides, democracy, as much of the world is
discovering, is so much more endearing and enduring an idea than are dynasties.
89. See supra notes 21-33; see also Sadker, Thomas, and Sadker, Non-Sexist Teaching:
Overcoming Sex Bias in Teacher-Student Interaction, The Mid-Atlantic Center for Sex Equity,
The American University, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Education.
90. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 86, at 27. See generally PUBLIC
EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES: LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY PRO-
POSALS FOR SINGLE-SEX, SINGLE-RACE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Apr. 1991) (working draft).
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id. at 13.
93. Id. at 14.
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entrance requirements, and reducing suspensions.94 The program is
designed to raise the self-esteem of black male students through emphasis
on African heritage. All schools are to assess the condition of their black
male students. Four pilot schools have been assigned African-American
male advocates. The project is to be funded through existing resources,
redirecting current funds, new funds, and possibly some grant money.
The proposal recommends allocating $250,000 from the general fund
budget.95
In Prince George's County, Maryland, public schools are trying yet
another approach that can best be described as excellence and equity
rather than resegregation. Faced with the dramatic crisis of the African-
American male in public education, along with its own constant problem
in "implementing equity in employment and in curriculum, instruction,
and the treatment of African-American male students," 96 Prince
George's County has used the information gathered by its task force as a
mandate to intensify efforts to promote equity as a key element of
restructuring schools for everyone. Its recommendations include
increasing expenditures to match those of its magnet schools for
gifted students, multicultural education, hiring more African
American teachers, counselors and administrators with a focus on
increasing the presence of black males in the classroom, and work-
ing with other agencies to implement a multi-service approach to
schools serving disadvantaged communities.97
In Detroit, the Detroit Public Schools (DPS) have sought to estab-
lish a Male Academy in kindergarten through eighth grade.98 The goal
is "increasing the likelihood that urban males will grow up 'whole' and
prepared to met the challenges of life and living." 99 Significant aspects of
the Male Academy are an Afrocentric curriculum, a Rites of Passage
Program, courses on spirituality, mentors, tutors, extended school activi-
ties, and a network of supports to encourage students to achieve and set
goals." The DPS Male Academy proposal is offered as "one of a
number of alternative schools that have been.., established to deal with
the problems of educating urban youth."'01 According to the proposal,
staff is to participate in "workshops, training classes and planning ses-
94. Id.
95. Id. at 14-15; Improving the Achievement of African American Males, San Diego City
Schools, Office of the Deputy Superintendent, July, 1989 (on fie with author).
96. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 86, at 15.
97. Id. at 15-16.
98. Male Academy Grades K-8, A Demonstration Program for At-Risk Males. Detroit
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sions that focus on the developmental needs of male students."'1 2 The
Detroit Public Schools plan to evaluate the Male Academy by docu-
menting activities, attitudes, and perceptions of the staff. DPS will con-
sider data on school achievement, including academic skills, attendance,
and student conduct, in determining the advantages of a single-sex
school. "In accordance with the District's policy on alternative schools
of choice, if the school did not attain a satisfactory or excellent status and
adequate building utilization within three years, it Would lose its alterna-
tive School of Choice classification and be subject to District interven-
tion." ' 3 The Detroit plan, which is couched in terms of gender and not
overtly of race, is the only plan so far to be tested in the courts.
VII. The Garrett Decision' 1°
This section considers the only litigation challenging the constitu-
tionality of AMBSs to reach the courts, starting with the plan itself and
the genesis of the challenge. It examines within the context of Brown the
purported invitation by the schools to males of different races, and ex-
plores the ramifications of the exclusion of females against the backdrop
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Genesis of the Litigation
The Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit
scheduled the opening of three Male Academies for August 26, 1991.1"5
These schools were to serve exclusively approximately 250 boys in pre-
school through fifth grade.10 6 Grades six through eight were to be
phased in over the next few years, bringing the total to 600 boys eligible
to receive excellent educational opportunities not available to girls. 07
The Academies were to offer special programs described above,'08 in-
cluding "futuristic lessons in preparation for 21st century careers, an em-
phasis on male responsibility, mentors, Saturday classes, individualized
counseling, extended classroom hours, and student uniforms." ' 9
102. Id.
103. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich.
1991).
104. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
105. Id at 1006.
106. Id
107. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 86, at 14; Demonstration Pro-
gram, supra note 98.
108. See Demonstration Program, supra note 98 and accompanying text.
109. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Mich 1991).
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The legal challenge to the Detroit Male Academies was initiated by
Shawn Garrett, a Detroit resident individually and as "next friend" to
her four-year-old daughter, Crystal Garrett, enrolled in the Detroit pub-
lic preschool, as well as by Nancy Doe, a Detroit resident individually,
and as "next friend" to her daughters Jane, Judy, and Jessica Doe who
were enrolled in the Detroit public schools.' 10 With the Male Academies
scheduled to open on September 3, 1991, the plaintiffs sought a tempo-
rary restraining order to prevent the taking of any steps to implement the
Male Academies as well as a preliminary injunction enjoining the defend-
ant from excluding girls from the Male Academies and "directing the
defendant to modify those aspects of the Male Academies, such as the
sex-specific name, that deter girls from applying to the schools, and re-
quiring defendant to advertise, on the same basis as the initial promotion
of the Male Academies, the availability of the Academies to girls." 11'
B. The Arguments
The motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on August
5, 1991.112 Emotions began to run high in Detroit. Before oral argument
could be heard on the preliminary injunction, the Garretts were sub-
jected to threatening phone calls and intimidating comments from mem-
bers of the community, the result of which was that Shawn Garrett both
individually and as "next friend" to Crystal Garrett, voluntary dismissed
her action." 3 The campaign of harassment reflected an unfortunate anti-
democratic disposition, which contrasted with the traditional nonviolent
ideology of the Civil Rights Movement." 4
The plaintiffs argued in their preliminary statement that the
defendant's actions in establishing three Male Academies to pro-
vide excellent educational opportunities for 600 boys in the Detroit
school system, while declining to permit girls to benefit from the
enhanced learning opportunities available in the Male Academies
[violated] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, federal statutes forbidding gender discrimination in federally
funded programs, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, and
110. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006.
111. Plaintiff's motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Id.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs included the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, the ACLU
Fund of Michigan, and the firm of Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian.
112. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1005.
113. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1005 n.1.
114. Any analysis of the legal issues surrounding All-Male Black Schools would be incom-
plete if these incidents that drove the Garretts from the litigation, leaving only anonymous
plaintiffs, were not at least mentioned.
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Michigan statutory law.11 5
In terms of federal causes of action, the complaint116 alleged that by
establishing the Male Academies, the Board of Education deprived plain-
tiffs of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has violated Title IX of the Education
Amendment of 1972117 and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.11
C. Background to the Arguments
An effective analysis of these causes of action necessitates an exami-
nation of some further information. Efforts had been made, for example,
to reduce the possibility of a constitutional challenge to the Academies.
Much as the complaint is cleverly drafted to provide an independent and
adequate state ground for a decision striking down the Male Academies,
should there be an effective challenge on appeal to the federal grounds, 19
115. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich.
1991). State grounds allege that the policies and practices of the Detroit Board of Education in
developing, establishing, and promoting the Male Academies, and in denying plaintiffs access
to and limiting their participation in such Academies because of their sex, violates the plain-
tiffs' rights under the Michigan State Elliot-Larsen Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.102, 37.2302
(a) and 37.2402, for which a cause of action is afforded by Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2801; that
the Detroit Board of Education's establishment of three separate Male Academies that exclude
girls on account of their sex and are open only to boys violates plaintiffs' rights under the
Michigan State School Code of 1976, Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1146; that the policies and
practices of the Detroit Board of Education in establishing three Male Academies that exclude
girls solely on the basis of their sex has denied plaintiffs their right to equal protection of the
laws of Michigan, in violation of Article 1, § 2 of the Michigan State Constitution.
116. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 14-15, Garrett.
117. 10 U.S.C. § 1681. See also 34 C.F.R. § 106 et. seq. The Board is subject to Title IX
and the regulations thereunder because it receives federal funds.
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et. seq. A private cause of action is afforded under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1706.
119. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). But see Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983) (upholding federal jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement
that the decision below rested on adequate and independent grounds). The Court in Long
established a new presumption of state dependence on federal law. The Court assumed that
the state court relied on federal law when the state court decision "fairly appears to rest pri-
marily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and inde-
pendence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion .. ." Id. at
1040-41. When a state court's opinion or judgment incorporates a "plain statement... that
the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves com-
pel the result that the court has reached" and that the state court decision rests on "bona fide
separate, adequate and independent [state] grounds the [Supreme Court] ... will not under-
take to review the decision." Id
Since the Detroit case was brought in federal district court, this reasoning is not directly
applicable. Since the decision is based on both state statutory and state constitutional law,
however, the case presents problems similar to Michigan v. Long, in that the Supreme Court
might not consider the state grounds sufficient in themselves to support the decision and could
conclude that the federal constitutional issues were paramount. Even if the Supreme Court
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the Detroit "Male Academies" plan had been drawn up with a view to-
wards potential legal challenges.
In October 1990, the Detroit Board of Education authorized the
General Superintendent of the Detroit Public Schools to appoint a task
force to review the possibility of creating a Male Academy for the De-
troit Public Schools. The Male Academy Task Force, chaired by Dr.
Arthur M. Carter, issued a draft proposal for a Male Academy, grades
K-8, on December 7, 1990.120 On February 26, 1991, the School Board
passed a resolution approving the creation of a Male Academy to be
opened in the 1991-92 school year and directed the Superintendent to
take necessary steps to "encourage formation of such an academy." 121
Pursuant to the School Board's resolution, the Superintendent pre-
pared a flyer for distribution to boys eligible to apply for the Male Acad-
emy. The flyer indicated that the Male Academy was "created to build
strong character and ensure academic excellence," and that "males from
every nationality, race and/or religion will be welcomed."' 122 In imple-
menting the February 26 resolution, the Board elected to open three
academies instead of one: the Cooper, Marxhausen, and Woodward
Schools. 123
The invitation to "males from every nationality, race and/or reli-
gion" to apply is clearly designed to avoid potential problems with
Brown, lest an overtly all-black school be found to be a form of reverse
segregation by race and hence a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The language of the flier by implication decries a school that would
not welcome non-black students. But given the curriculum's emphasis
on "Afrocentrism" as stated in the flier designed to solicit applications to
the Academies, 1 24 it could be argued that this is a sign to potential appli-
cants that the schools are meant to be all-black as well as all-male. For
what else does "Afrocentrism" mean but the placing of things African at
the center of the life of the school? And if that is the schools' objective,
who else but blacks would be comfortable in such an environment?
were to find that the United States Constitution and federal legislation does not prohibit the
Male Academies, it could nevertheless sustain the lower court's finding that the Michigan
constitution and statutes do prohibit them as a matter of adequate state grounds, unless it also
found that the federal statutes preempted the field, making the Michigan law unconstitutional
by virtue of the Enforcement Clause, injunction with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and under the Supremacy Clause.
120. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit A, Garrett.
121. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit B, Garrett.
122. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit C, Garrett.
123. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 6, Garrett.
124. Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit C, Garrett.
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D. Brown in a New Dimension
If nothing else, Brown obliges one to ask whether that feeling of
inferiority and the irreparable harm that forced segregation imposes on
black school children vanishes when the segregation is created volunta-
rily as part of an ideology of separatism? Brown taught us, in essence,
that blacks needed to be integrated into white schools and that the Con-
stitution required it. The new separatism teaches that African-American
boys need to be kept separate so that their identities and egos can escape
the harm done to them when they are forced to attend integrated schools
of both sexes. It teaches that as long as the all-male, all-black environ-
ment is voluntary, the element of shame is eliminated, moving the
schools beyond the scope of the doctrine in Brown and beyond its con-
cerns. The new dimension entered is presumably one of self-respect, so
that the African-American male can function as a whole human being in
a hostile world. If this is the subliminal message of the flier encouraging
male applicants from "every nationality, race and/or religion," then the
overt tactic being employed by the Detroit Board of Education was mis-
leading. Who else would apply to the Male Academies (even with the
terms "black" or "African-American" left out) unless there was some
undisclosed plan to bus in white boys from Grosse Pointe? Arguably, by
so advertising, the Detroit School Board evaded a claim that the acade-
mies violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
due to racial discrimination. This apparently was the objective. Cer-
tainly, the addition of the word "Pluralistic" '125 in brackets next to
"Afrocentric," does little to diminish the impact of "Afrocentric." These
were meant to be all-black as well as all-male schools, with a token of
respect thrown to Brown, as one might accord an infirm though once
helpful relative.
E. The Admissions Policy
The plaintiffs emphasized that the Male Academy students were to
be "selected based on an 'array of characteristics and attributes,' includ-
ing achievement scores, citizenship grades, single-parent household, at-
tendance, grade point average, retention in grade, teacher assessment,
potential for success and letters of recommendation." '126 Moreover, each
125. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 9, Garrett. Other "special features" offered to boys attending
the Male Academies are: Rites of Passage, futuristic lessons in preparation for 21st century
careers, individualized counseling, extended day-extended hours, student uniforms, foreign
language classes, and competitive sports.
126. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 12, Garrett; Demonstration Program, supra note 98, Exhibit
A at 19-20.
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applicant would be ranked based on these criteria and males from a
"mix" of backgrounds would be selected for the Male Academies, "one-
third from the highest ranking group, and one-third from each of the
middle and lower ranking groups."'12 7
The irony of this admissions policy is that it limits the enrollment of
the "at-risk" African American males the academies were purportedly
established to serve. The requirement that each boy's parent(s) must sign
a "covenant of participation" with the school principal, agreeing to a
certain amount of participation, 12 only serves to compound this irony.
Since parental involvement and concern is a key indicator of school suc-
cess, this requirement, the plaintiffs argued "will effectively 'select out'
many of the students who, because parents are not involved in their edu-
cation, are most at-risk."' 29 In actuality, what the Detroit School Board
had done was to create with taxpayer money exclusive, all-male, virtually
all-black, prep schools serving the Detroit black middle class. The
schools would give male children of the black middle class a leg up in
college entrance competition and future career choices. 3 '
The Detroit Proposal did not totally ignore the needs of female stu-
dents. At-risk ghetto female students would get support through special
schools of their own. According to the Proposal, however, "females...
are not experiencing problems to the same severity and extent [as males].
When they do, pregnancy and parenting appear to be the primary
cause."'' But as the plaintiffs argued in their complaint, "[t]he statistics
cited in the Proposal, however, suggest that the urban crisis is not limited
by gender but, rather, affects all urban children. For example, in the
1989-90 school year, female students had a dropout rate of 45%-a high
rate that is symptomatic of the same lack of opportunities and absence of
self-esteem that face urban boys." '132 And the Proposal itself points out
that fewer "than half of the females who drop out of school do so because
of pregnancy."' 33
To meet the special educational needs of "at-risk" urban girls (preg-
nant and parenting teens), the Proposal called for the establishment of
three special schools called "Continuing Education Centers" (CECs).
127. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 12, Garrett; Demonstration Program, supra note 98, Exhibit
A at 21-22.
128. See, e.g., Marxhausen Charter, Woodward Charter, Cooper Charter.
129. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 12, Garrett.
130. But see Meyers, supra note 88, at A16.
131. Demonstration Program, supra note 98, at 17.
132. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 13-14, Garrett; Demonstration Program, supra note 98, at 6
(Table I).
133. Demonstration Program, supra note 98, at 15-17; Plaintiffs' Complaint at 13, Garrett.
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On its face, then, the Proposal attempted to address the "separate but
equal" requirement of Hogan 34 with a three-for-three trade off; three
special academies for boys, three for girls. But that is where the similar-
ity ends.
The function of the CECs would be to serve pregnant girls in grades
seven through twelve who have low academic achievement.
Girls who are admitted to CECs transfer from their home school
to continue their education for one or more semesters during preg-
nancy and after pregnancy, and transfer back to their home school
upon readiness to return. The students' programs are supple-
mented by classes in parenting, child development and care as well
as by nurses, counselors and homebound teachers .... [P]regnant
girls who are not academically at risk are not eligible for CECs and
may thus be denied the support services necessary to continue their
education. Most significantly, girls who are not pregnant or
parenting-who represent the majority of female dropouts-are
not eligible for CECs. 1'35
Moreover, it is apparent that the CECs were not designed
to offer an enriched educational environment to girls nor are the
schools intended to prevent the underlying problems that urban
girls face and which contribute to their high dropout rate, Le. early
pregnancy, few role models, and the absence of other opportuni-
ties. Instead, CECs represent an after-the-fact accommodation to
the fact that pregnancy is a temporary disability that, as a practical
matter, may require special treatment such as childcare, special-
ized medical attention and special support services.136
So, while the Proposal created a veneer of equality, in substance,
girls in the Detroit Public School system were to be deprived of the spe-
cialized programs and opportunities that the Male Academies would of-
fer to boys. 137 An astounding argument by the Board of Education
further exposed its lack of candor in characterizing the CECs. The
Board argued that the Male Academies "do not specifically prohibit at-
tendance by females," 138 and pointed to the fact that one female had been
provisionally admitted, conditioned upon the resolution of litigation.1 39
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court rejected this argument
out of hand:
Although the Board states the Male Academies are not intended or
designed to be discriminatory single-sex programs in one breath, in
134. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
135. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 13-14, Garrett.
136. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 14, Garrett.
137. Id.
138. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
139. Id. at n.13
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the next it asserts that the program is designed to gather data to
determine what type of curriculum and teacher-training programs
are necessary to alleviate the disparate impact of the current educa-
tional system on urban males. The Board cannot have it both
ways. 140
F. The Decision
Only that portion of the decision that deals with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be considered, as the pur-
pose of this Article is to analyze the legitimacy of the "New Separatism"
from the point of view of the Federal Constitution. In granting the pre-
liminary injunction, the court relied on the two-pronged test of Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan:'4' The exclusion of an individual from
a publicly-funded school because of his or her sex violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless the defendant can
show the sex-based "classification serves 'important governmental objec-
fives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives.' "142
The district court in Garrett first dismissed the "separate but equal"
method of satisfying the Hogan test because "Detroit offers no schools
for girls even comparable to the Male Academies."' 43  Justice
O'Connor's analysis in Hogan is germane:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based
classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory ob-
jective is ... legitimate and important, we next determine whether
the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship
is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical ap-
plication of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the
proper roles of men and women."
In affirming intermediate scrutiny for gender classification, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that, "[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-
based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and
directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately bur-
140. Id. at 1012.
141. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
142. Id at 724 (citations omitted).
143. 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 n.4.
144. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-26 (citations omitted).
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dened."145 But such a "benign" justification requires "searching analy-
sis." '146 A state can establish a "compensatory purpose [justification] ...
only if members of the gender benefitted by the classification actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification." 47 This must be con-
sidered in light of Craig v. Boren, 48 in which the Court held that gender
classification could not be used as a "proxy for other, more germane ba-
ses of classification." 149
In the Detroit case, the court found that the Board could not meet
the standard in Hogan and Craig. In a decision that is bound to fuel the
fire in the debate over AMBSs, the court found that
the Board cannot meet this standard because the Board's policy of
excluding girls inappropriately relies on gender as a proxy for "at-
risk" students. The Academies were developed in response to the
crisis facing African-American males manifested by high homicide,
unemployment, and drop-out rates. While these statistics under-
score a compelling need, they fall short of demonstrating that ex-
cluding girls is substantially related to the achievement of the
Board's objectives. The Board has proffered no evidence that the
presence of girls in the classroom bears a substantial relationship to
the difficulties facing urban males. 50
This analysis necessarily leads to the court's conclusion that the
Male Academies improperly used gender as a classification as a "proxy
for other, more germane bases of classification." '51 The "at-risk" group
was not only urban (euphemistic for black) males, but all children, in-
cluding girls, in the Detroit public schools, a reality the court found am-
ply supported by the data. If the object of the Male Academies was to
rescue the "at risk" group, the Board should, the Court suggested, ad-
dress itself to all the children in that group, including those male stu-
dents who were most at-risk. The admissions policy specified a mix of
students with a wide range of achievement levels, thus lessening the
probability that those who were most at-risk would gain admission. 52
Since urban girls also "drop out of school, suffer loss of self-esteem and
become involved in criminal activity," ignoring their plight "institution-
alizes inequality and perpetuates the myth that females are doing well in
the current system." 1
53
145. Id. at 728.
146. Id.
147. Id
148. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
149. Id., at 198.
150. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich 1991).
151. Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
152. Id. at 1008.
153. Id.
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Moreover, the court agreed that the special curriculum for the
Academies
suggests a false dichotomy between the roles and responsibilities of
boys and girls. For example, the Rites of Passage curriculum
teaches that "men need a vision and a plan for living," "men
master their emotions," and "men acquire skills and knowledge to
overcome life's obstacles." These issues confront all adolescents
and are not rites peculiarly male. Therefore, they are insufficient to
justify gender-based classification. 151
In Hogan, the attack on the gender-exclusive Mississippi University
for Women's School of Nursing by a male seeking to pursue his studies
as a nurse gave rise to the defense that it could be proved that the wo-
men-only policy compensated for historical discrimination against wo-
men, a defense that the Supreme Court ultimately rejected.1 5 5 But in
Garrett, the Detroit School Board argued, the situation was entirely dif-
ferent, with statistics showing that the present delivery of education had
"resulted in substantially lower achievement levels for males than for fe-
males and that the Academies are the solution to this problem. The pri-
mary rationale for the Academies is simply that co-educational programs
aimed at improving male performance have failed."' 56
The court replied that it was "wary" of accepting such a rationale:
Although co-educational programs have failed, there is no showing
that it is the co-educational factor that results in failure. Even
more dangerous is the prospect that should the male academies
proceed and succeed, success would be equated with the absence of
girls rather than any of the educational factors that more probably
caused the outcome. 157
The Board attempted to rely on its creation of the single-sex CECs
with their alternative programs which it said addressed the special
problems of urban females, particularly pregnancy, and argued that be-
cause urban females experienced academic performance problems, this
did not weaken the importance of their objective in opening Male
Academies.158
But even if the objective of opening the Male Academies is impor-
tant, the degree of its importance does not eradicate the burden of show-
ing how the sexually discriminatory means are related to the
achievement of that objective. And since there was no evidence that the
presence of girls in any way causes the problems that urban black boys
154. Id. at 1007.
155. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-31.
156. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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experience in school, this second part of the Hogan test was not met. 159
The Board then sought to establish that the second prong of the
Hogan analysis-that the means must be substantially related to the ob-
jective-was satisfied for three reasons:
First, the establishment of male academies is critical to expedi-
tiously determine what curriculum and training programs will
work to keep urban males out of the City's morgues and prisons.
Second, the Board has already reviewed smaller scale experimental
programs at two schools that specifically addressed the special
needs of urban males and found them successful in improving the
overall academic and behavioral aspects of the urban males' lifes-
tyle. Third, the Board knows that current co-ed programs do not
work. Consequently, the Board finds that research supports the
establishment of an experimental school with a specialized curricu-
lum to address the special needs of urban males. 16
The Board noted that Ray Johnson, Assistant Principal at Cooper
Elementary School, created a voluntary extra-curricular mentorship pro-
gram, "Man-to-Man," that was three years old and afforded male stu-
dents weekly interaction with professional male mentors across the city.
"Johnson asserts that the program has been successful and has led to
some improvement in the academic status of male participants. Wood-
ward School enacted a similar program which also met with success." 6 '
Although these smaller-scale experimental programs accomplished the
objective of improving the performance of urban males, the court empha-
sized that there was no showing as to why the exclusion of females was
necessary to accomplish the goals of combating unemployment, dropout
and homicide rates among urban males. The court commented that
"[t]here is no evidence that the educational system is failing urban males
because females attend school with males. In fact, the educational sys-
tem is also failing females." '62
A district court order granting a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction cannot be said to be a definitive statement on the
nature of "heightened scrutiny" or "intermediate scrutiny," the middle
scrutiny that is applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment to gender
classification. Since Hogan was a 5-4 decision with a strong dissent by
Justice Powell joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist, there remains the
possibility that the result in a case similar to Garrett could be different.
Powell argued for a rational basis test in higher education cases with
159. Id. at 1008.
160. Id. (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 1008 n.6.
162. Id.
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gender classifications, 63 a result that would be appealing to the New
Separatists. Hogan is distinguishable on the grounds that it is a higher
education case and hence deals with a level of separation of the sexes that
is harder to justify than on the lower school level, as the decision in
United States v. Virginia' makes clear. On the lower school level, there
may be important objectives that can be reached only through separation
of the sexes that were not thrashed out in Garrett. There might be evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that a disciplined environment can more
readily be sustained in single-sex elementary schools or high schools, or
that racial integration can be achieved with greater ease in single-sex ele-
mentary or high schools. Since the intermediate standard of scrutiny is
applicable, this would be easier to justify than a separation of school chil-
dren based on race. Further, if the separation were based solely on sex
and the schools for males and females could be said to be equal in the
educational and extracurricular activities offered, there should be no rea-
son to strike down such an arrangement on equal protection grounds.
The objections would ultimately have to be political, in the tradition
of McCulloch v. Maryland.'65 But in the final analysis, this is not what
the dispute is really about. It is not about gender; it is about race. For
when the decision in Garrett addresses the crisis of the young urban
male, we know it is not addressing itself to Oliver Barrett IV.' 66 It is
addressing itself to Bigger Thomas.167 And it is no accident that there is
no black female figure in American literature comparable to Bigger
Thomas.
In the penultimate paragraph of the court's order, the court not only
acknowledged who this case was about, but suggested that solutions
might exist that are comprehensive and inclusive. "Indeed there has
been a cry for help within this community," the court asserted.1 68 "It is
possible, the Court sees it as possible, that the exclusion of some can be
rectified to the benefit of all, including the young, black male, who is
indeed an endangered species."169
It is unfortunate that the perception of urban black males as being
"at-risk" and an "endangered species" in comparison with urban black
females was not explored more deeply in the arguments leading to the
163. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164. 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
165. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
166. ERic SEGAL, LOVE STORY (1971).
167. WRIGHT, supra note 37.
168. Temporary Restraining Order at 14, Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
169. Id.
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order. 7 It is conceivable that the white perception of black women,
even in the post-colonial condition, is that they are less threatening than
black males. There may be structures in the post-slavery African-Ameri-
can mind that visualize black women as somehow self-sufficient and with
more options for survival in a hostile culture that undervalues black mas-
culinity except in the context of spectator sports. 171 It is this "undervalu-
ing" that the court neglected, except in those sparse words towards the
end of the order.
The Proposal failed because the court recognized young black urban
females as an "at-risk" group. While the court's language is persuasive,
the problem remains as to its characterization. The court's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in particular, is steeped in a post-segregation
ideology that was forged in the Civil Rights Movement. Implicit in its
reasoning is the cultural identity of a modem, assimilated African Amer-
ican who perceives the ideology of the New Separatism as a threat, not
only to the African-American community through a reintroduction of
segregation, but to the identities of those very individuals who have be-
gun to share power in a society that moves glacially but which is not so
oblivious as to fail to create opportunities for change. With this in mind,
the court sought to create a new safety valve on its own by diffusing the
intensity of the New Separatism. By holding that the plaintiffs could
succeed at trial in showing an equal protection violation based on gender,
the court, in effect, ordered the admission of girls to the Male Academies
on the threat that they would otherwise be declared unconstitutional.172
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court addressed itself to
the opposing parties in the case: "The parties are ordered to get together
and meet as a result of this Court's ruling today." 173 This action ex-
pressed the court's hope for a synthetic jurisprudence, a neo-Hegelian
dialectic in which the thesis, racial integration, and its antithesis, separa-
tism, meet and synthesize to produce a new model to rescue young black
Americans who are sinking in the abysmal environment of Detroit and in
all of urban America. Even as it rejected the Proposal of the Detroit
Board of Education, it gave credence to the Board's efforts by accepting
the validity of its objectives; the preservation of an "endangered species":
the young urban black male. This is an image that must somehow be
170. For such a consideration, see generally, Smith, supra note 3.
171. See generally Sara Suleri, Woman Skin Deep: Feminism and the Postcolonial Condi-
tion, Critical Inquiry, "Identities," Vol 18, Summer 1992.
172. Order at 14, Garrett.
173. Id.
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reconciled with the other image of the urban black male: the sociopathic
criminal. Neither the court nor either of the parties dealt with the "im-
portant government objectives" related to crime and criminals, as op-
posed to victimization.
If it could be shown that young urban black males are far more
likely to turn to serious crime, including crimes of violence, as the result
of the pressures of society and the seemingly hopeless future they have,
than young urban black females, who, while also victimized by the sys-
tem, are more likely to get pregnant or become involved with victimless
crimes such as prostitution, then it conceivably could have been argued
that separating the boys from the girls, with the concomitant crime pre-
vention programs implemented at the boys schools, might be substan-
tially related to the anti-crime objective. This argument would be
reinforced if the Male Academies were not selective, but were compre-
hensive with regard to the class of students most likely to become serious
dangers, not only to themselves, but to society. It is not likely, however,
that a proposal along these lines would ever be adopted. Its very hypoth-
esis is based on a preconception about urban black male youth that
would inevitably be challenged as bigoted and stereotypical, a sufficient
reason under Hogan to be rejected.
The Garrett court appeared to be suggesting that it might accept
special programs designed for young urban males within the context of a
normal, co-educational, racially integrated school. But this, too, would
inevitably run into trouble. If, for example, the extra-curricular "Man-
to-Man" mentor system that was introduced with such success at the
Cooper Elementary School and The Woodward School174 were imple-
mented on a regular basis in the Detroit school system, and no compara-
ble program were introduced for girls, it would be difficult to sustain.
The recognizable differences between men and women that should be
able to support a variety of different programs fails the equal protection
test of "heightened scrutiny," as Justice Powell lamented in his dissent in
Hogan.7 ' Nevertheless, the price to be paid for abandoning that test for
one of mere rationality is far too high to be acceptable, even though the
stricter test sometimes runs counter to the wishes of women to have all-
women institutions funded by the state. Logically, based on the experi-
ence of women in the United States, there should be a two-tiered test for
gender classification; a "rationality" test when the gender classification is
for the benefit of women, and a "heightened scrutiny" test when the gen-
der classification is used to exclude them. However, such a structure is
174. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 n.6.
175. 458 U.S. 718, 745 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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difficult to imagine under current Supreme Court. Given the choice be-
tween "rationality" and "heightened scrutiny," it is better to keep the
weapon that fights exclusion, the one that obliged the court in Garrett to
rule against the Male Academies.
The Garrett court, then, while upholding the constitutional protec-
tion of women's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, left Bigger Thomas stranded, where he always has
been, in the limbo of American constitutional interpretation. The De-
troit Board of Education elected not to appeal or go to trial, withdrew
the litigation, and avoided spending the estimated one million dollars it
would have cost. The Board entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs
setting aside certain seats so that girls could be admitted into the Detroit
AMBSs, on the condition that the plaintiffs would not pursue the
litigation.176
This ambiguous result leaves unanswered certain important ques-
tions with regard to the social science foundation of interpretations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Were these
question to be answered, they might shed light on the problem of
AMBSs: To what extent does the social psychology of Dr. Kenneth
Clark still legitimately direct our constitutional system on Bigger
Thomas' behalf? To what extent does the contrary approach of the
Afrocentricists and New Separatists find legitimacy in the Constitution
as the result of a dynamic in our social order that has superseded Brown?
VIII. The Dichotomy of American Race Relations and
Competing Social Theories
This section considers one critique of the conclusions drawn by the
court in Garrett, and focuses on the relevance of empirical data in consti-
tutional decisionmaking. What is at issue here is the holding by the Gar-
rett court that African-American females are in as equally a poor a
position as that of African-American males in American society; a con-
clusion that is the foundation for sustaining the Equal Protection chal-
lenge. This holding, however, contradicts Smith's critique, raising the
question of it is possible to conclude that perception of the data can be
correct while another is erroneous.
The opposing views of Edward Calm and Kenneth Clark are also
examined with regard to the relevance of the social science data in
176. Smith, supra note 3, at 2006 n.8; See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1004; Stipulation and
Agreement at 2, Garrett, 775 F. Supp. 1004; Statement of Deborah M. McGriff, General Su-
perintendent, Detroit Public Schools (Nov. 6, 1991).
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Brown. Calm denies any relevance and argues that natural law was the
true basis of the decision, whereas Clark insists the scientific data was
highly relevant to the decision. This author sides with Clark, but
reserves judgment as to whether the decision in Brown can be said to be a
form of natural law.
A. Smith's Critique of Garrett as a Formulation of the Dichotomy
In criticizing Garrett, Smith argued:
The district court also concluded that the Board would probably
not be able to show that the exclusion of females was substantially
related to the Board's purpose of assisting African-American
males. It noted that the statistical evidence provided by the Board
did not satisfy its burden of showing how the exclusion of females
was "necessary to combat unemployment, dropout and homicide
rates among urban males." The test is inappropriate to gender
classification cases; the district court was applying some form of
strict scrutiny. In gender discrimination cases, the Supreme Court
has not required a governmental entity to show a probability of
success. Instead, the Court has only required that an entity per-
form a reasoned analysis and not rely on stereotypical notions.
The Detroit Board did not rely on stereotypes. It commissioned
expert and parents, who studied the situation in Detroit and pro-
vided an extensive recommendation. 177
But Smith misread Garrett. Indeed, the court did find that urban
black male youths are an "endangered species." '178 What the court con-
cluded was that there was virtually no evidence to support the contention
that the elimination of females from the school environment would ac-
complish the desired objectives, such as the reduction of the unemploy-
ment and dropout rates, the reduction in drug addiction, and other
plagues affecting the black urban male youth. 179 This was not a form of
strict scrutiny, but merely an objective application of the two-pronged
test of Hogan. The court defended the rights of females by asserting that
they, too, had been victimized by the system and were entitled to the
same special treatment. 8 0 There was no showing in the court's reason-
ing that it imposed some stricter standard than the one of intermediate
scrutiny established by the Supreme Court for gender classification, a
standard that was applied with considerable clarity in United States v.
Virginia.81 Further, Smith's argument that AMBSs in Detroit are ac-
177. Smith, supra note 3, at 2006 n.8 (citations omitted). See also, Demonstration Pro-
gram, supra note 98.
178. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007.
179. Id. at 1007-08.
180. Id.
181. 776 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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ceptable because they compensate for past discrimination against young
black urban males does not accurately apply this exception carved out by
Justice O'Connor in Hogan. In rejecting the University's argument in
Hogan, she acknowledged that "[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-
based classification favoring sex can be justified if it intentionally and
directly assists members of the one sex that is disproportionately bur-
dened."" '2 But such a benign justification requires "searching analy-
sis."' 8 3 "[A] state can establish a compensatory purpose [justification]
... only if members of the gender benefitted by the classification actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification." ' 4
The operative word here is "actually," for no matter how searching
the analysis, if there is no showing that the members of the gender
benefitted by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to
the classification, the justification ceases to be benign. In Hogan, it could
not be shown that women were disadvantaged in the nursing profession.
In Garrett, the court could not find that black males were worse off
than black females in a society that inflicts irreparable harm on them
both. Consequently, it concluded that the result should be the same as in
Hogan. There simply was no basis for upholding a gender classification
under the "heightened scrutiny" standard. But ultimately, such a finding
depends profoundly on a vision of reality that is inevitably affected by the
investigator's "apparatus of perception." ' 5 The difference in perception
of the data by the Garrett court and Smith raises the larger question as to
the role of social science data in general with respect to constitutional
decisionmaking.
B. The Relevance of Social Science Data: The Competing Theories
What is in question is not legal precedent but the role of social sci-
ence data in discrimination litigation. When does a hypothesis about a
class of persons in a given institutional environment reach the level of
certainty required to justify critical constitutional conclusions? And in
such a situation, is it possible or even desirable that the viewpoint of the
perceiver, the social scientist, be excluded from the data offered in sup-
port of the hypothesis? As Immanuel Kant observed, "things in them-
selves, which are the causes of our sensations are unknowable," and what
we believe to be empirical knowledge is affected by our "apparatus of
182. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 728; GUNTHER, supra note 53, at 673.
185. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (2nd ed. 1787) (paraphrased by
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 707 (1945)).
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perception," which includes the subjective elements of "space and
time."'
186
Alexander Pekelis, in his argument for a "jurisprudence of welfare,"
observed almost half a century ago:
We cannot turn back the clock. Social scientists [economists, soci-
ologists and psychologists] are with us for good, and are going to
remain in the very midst of government .... Judges may and
should become acquainted with the various nonlegal disciplines...
[iln order to acquire the conviction that they can furnish no more
certainty than Constitutions, statutes or precedents.18 7
This analysis should have dispelled the notion of certainty in what
Michel Foucault described as the "human sciences."' 88 At most,
probability is all that they can offer. But in the context of judicial
supremacy, this is problematic. As a famous passage from Cooper v.
Aaron'89 declared:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as
"the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in
the notable case of Marbury v. Madison ... that "[lit is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that the fed-
eral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti-
tution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country asaperanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system.ee
If this is so, the lack of a definitive approach to reading that instrument is
unsettling. Not only does the prospect of conflicting hermeneutics dis-
rupt the notion of order and predictability, lending credibility to the no-
tion that chaos inhabits the province of constitutional interpretation, but
the arbitrary selection of empirical data and its analysis by scientists to
either rationalize or determine a particular outcome with regard to such
186. I& Kant referred to the unknown "things in themselves" as "noumena," arguing that
"the concept of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to
things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge. IMMAN-
UEL KANT, CRrrIQUE OF PURE REASON, (1781) (quoted in WALTER JONES, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, 846 (1952)).
187. Alexander H. Pekelis, The Case For a Jurisprudence of Welfare, 2 SOCIAL RESEARCH,
in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS 38 (Milton R.
Konvitz, ed. 1970).
188. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 375 (1970).
189. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (the Court's first decision on school desegregation to follow the
remands in Brown).
190. Id. at 18.
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interpretation further complicates any attempt to legitimize the ultimate
decision-making process under the constitutional system. 191
In rejecting the reliance on the findings of social scientists in the
process of judicial review in Brown v. Board of Education,'92 Edmond
Calm argued that it was erroneous to maintain that the Brown decision
was "caused by the testimony and opinions of the scientists." He as-
serted that the constitutional rights of Negroes-or any other Ameri-
cans-should not rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the
scientific demonstrations in these records.193 Apart from attacking social
science evidence as unreliable, Calm asserted that the cruelty inherent in
racial segregation "is obvious and evident." 194 In so arguing, he juxta-
posed two forms of reasoning: empirical, a posteriori inductive reason-
ing, and rational, a priori deductive reasoning. 195 To Cahn, racial
segregation in the schools was unconstitutional. The injuries it imposed
were clear and self-evident, so that the Court could take judicial notice of
it without reference to any empirical data. What use the Court did make
of the findings of the social scientists in the controversial footnote 11 was,
he alleged, simply a magnanimous gesture in a decision that mentioned
neither the testimony of the expert witnesses nor the statements submit-
ted by the thirty-two social scientists. 196
Calm argued that "separate but equal" was a contradictory standard
negated by pure reason. In so arguing, Calm was advocating the applica-
tion of a priori principles to constitutional adjudication. These are the
principles that are separate and distinct from empirical perception,
knowable to all through the exercise of their pure reason. 197 To Kant,
time and space were basic a priori perceptions. To Thomas Aquinas, the
191. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pfinciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 34 (1959); JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRisis (1975).
192. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
193. Cahn, supra note 35, at 157-58.
194. Id.
195. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (N.K. Smith trans., Random
House 1958) (1787): "But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow
that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is
made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge
(sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of
knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it
from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separat-
ing it. This, then, is a question which at least calls for closer examination, and does not allow
of any off-hand answer: whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent.., of the
senses. Such 'knowledge is entitled a priori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its
sources a posteriori, that is, in experience."
196. Calm, supra note 35, at 160-61.
197. Clark, The Desegregation Cases, supra note 35, at 227.
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basic a priori principle was what he termed "natural law."19 Since the
basic precept of natural law is to "do good and avoid evil,"199 the prob-
lem of American race relations must, perforce, be examined according to
this dictate, or so Calm tells us by implication. The adoption by the
Constitution of natural law becomes, in this context, an a priori form of
comprehension rather than an empirical one.
The decision in Brown contains scant references to legal or other
authority. Along with the social science authority cited in footnote 11,
there are some references to findings in other decisions, and an inconclu-
sive, cursory history of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision ap-
pears to rest on what the Court considers to be self-evident: that
segregation is evil per se.2°° While this practice of a priori reasoning was
once accepted during a period of history when the country's perception
of good and evil was immature, it was no longer acceptable by 1954 in
the United States.
But just as Calm, who supported this interpretation of the Court's
decision in Brown, argued that school segregation by race is, in essence,
against natural law and hence against the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the New Separatists argued the opposite con-
tention, clouding any vision of what is inherently good or inherently evil.
The passage of time, they explained, has shown that a decent education
for young black urban males cannot be achieved through the vision of
Brown, that the "modernist" liberal philosophy of integration has failed
and that only a "post-modernist"'2 ' separatist philosophy can succeed by
virtue of its own a priori premises, which can be perceived and appreci-
ated only by those who are African-American. 2  What seems to be
"self-evident" to the New Separatism is not that segregation is evil per se
198. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Treatise on Law,
Question 91: "[T]his participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the
natural law.")
199. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Treatise on Law,
Second Article ("Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done. All other
precepts of the natural law are based on this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to
be done or avoided.").
200. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954). But see Clark, The Desegrega-
tion cases, supra note 35, at 227-28.
201. For an analysis of this elusive term, see Jean-Francois Lystard, Answering the Ques-
tion: What is Post-Modernism? in POSTMODERNISM-A READER (Thomas Docherty ed.,
1993).
202. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3; 1 JAWANZA KUNuFu, COUNTERING THE CONSPIR-
ACY TO DESTROY BLACK BoYs (1985); 2 JAwANZA KUNjUFu, COUNTERING THE CONSPIR-
ACY TO DESTROY BLACK BOYS (1986).
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(Dr. King),20 3 but that self-reliance and separatism are both good and
necessary (Malcolm X).204 Neither of these propositions is subject to em-
pirical verification; they lead to opposite conclusions with regard to so-
cial theory and race relations, and both affect one's vision of empirical
reality.20 5
The phenomenon that has led to this dichotomy is resegregation.
When Brown was decided in 1954, the majority of Americans lived in
cities, with the rest of the country predominantly rural, even though the
trend toward suburbanization was ineluctable.2 °6 "White flight," as it
came to be known, restructured all of American society, creating envi-
ronmental as well as social problems of enormous magnitude. Often the
goals of blacks and environmentalists clashed, as open space that black
groups wanted devoted to low income housing was preserved as parks,
"forever wild," or as agricultural preserves. Criticizing the policies in
Nassau County and Suffolk County on Long Island, which have devoted
thousands of acres to parks, an NAACP official observed, "They build
parks next to parks., 207 Blacks were, for the most part, either left behind
in the inner cities, or clustered together in the new suburban ghettos.
The old ghettos such as South Central Los Angeles became worse, ulti-
mately providing living proof of Langston Hughes' prophesy:
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
Like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore-
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-
Like syrupy sweet?
203. See GARRow, supra note 39.
204. See ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965).
205. Compare Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 425 (1960) ("Segregation is historically and contemporaneously associated in a function-
ing complex with practices which are indisputably and grossly discriminatory.") with Malcolm
X: "The only thing I want integrated is my coffee." MALCOLM X (Spike Lee Dir., 1992)
(Based on THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965)).
206. See SAMUEL KAPLAN, THE DREAM DEFERRED; PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING
IN SUBURBIA 1-18 (1976); THE USE OF LAND: A CITrZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN
GROWTH, A TASK FORCE REPORT BY THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, 84-86 (William
K. Reilly, ed., Crowell, 1973).
207. THE USE OF LAND, supra note 206, at 54. See also, KAPLAN, supra note 206, at 72-
86; MARK GOTrDIENER, PLANNED SPRAWL: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN SUBUR-
BIA 50-53 (Sage, 1977). These authorities are in accord with the author's experience as Direc-
tor of Natural Resources for the Town of East Hampton, New York from 1981 through 1983.
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Maybe it just sags
Like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?2°8
It is from the living patterns of blacks and whites in America that
the New Separatism gets its energy. If blacks will always live with blacks
and among blacks, then what is the meaning of desegregation? How use-
ful is strict scrutiny if it only scrutinizes de jure as opposed to de facto
segregation? Ironically, it is from the jurisprudential right that the New
Separatism gets its main allies. As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent in
Ayers v. Fordice,2° "tihere is nothing unconstitutional about a 'black'
school in the sense, not of a school that blacks must attend and that
whites cannot, but of a school that, as a consequence of private choice in
residence or in school selection, contains, and has long contained, a large
black majority."21 0
The challenge to constitutional interpretation almost forty years af-
ter Brown is whether or not there is a dynamic at work altering the
Court's a priori perception of reality so as to give rise to yet another
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with regard to both race and gender. The era of Plessy2 1I came and
went, jettisoned when the Warren Court insisted on an interpretation
consonant with the times. The results were celebrated, but as the eupho-
ria of the Civil Rights Movement, which had been torn apart by the
struggle between separatists and integrationists, waned in the aftermath
of the assassination of Dr. King,2 12 the triumph of Brown seemed an in-
creasingly empty one. With the failure of the "Black Power" movement,
the concept of a race war became increasingly remote.213 And as the
concept of integration in the crime and drug-ridden inner cities became a
chimera, there arose a movement that found itself curiously allied with
the jurisprudential right that believed Brown to be a relic from the War-
ren days. 214
Thus, Pamela Smith's argument that Brown should be limited to its
most narrow holding, that it "did not attack mere separation of the races,
208. LANGSTON HUGHES, Dream Deferred in LANGSTON HUGHES THE PANTHER AND
THE LASH: POEMS OF OUR TIMES (1951) (by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.).
209. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
210. Id. at 2743.
211. 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
212. See CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF
THE 1960s 191-211 (1981).
213. Id. at 215-64. Carson saw the cycle of "Black Power" as moving from internal con-
flicts to white suppression.
214. See Smith, supra note 3, at 2010 n.31 (quoting Scalia's dissent in Ayers v. Fordice with
approval).
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but de jure segregation,"21 and that the entire approach that the Court
has fashioned with regard to women under the Equal Protection Clause
is irrelevant to black women,21 6 is part of a much larger shift in strategy.
Far more Malcolm217 or Ron Karenga than Martin, this approach ac-
cepts the separation of the races as an inevitability that should be looked
on as an opportunity for growth and radical self-knowledge by African
Americans. Even its rhetoric is similar to the radical separatists of the
Sixties. As Julius Lester warned in 1967 (before his conversion to Ortho-
dox Judaism): The government's determination that we are the ones to
be eliminated by any means necessary, should never be underesti-
mated."2 Dr. Jawanza Kunjufu, "a consultant who has studied the
plight of the African-American male in the inner-city school system"2 9
in the 1980s and '90s, terms his three-volume opus Countering the Con-
spiracy to Destroy Black Boys.220 Unlike the American blacks of the
1950s who sought the protection of the Warren Court in breaking down
racial barriers to become part of the American mainstream, the New
Separatists are looking to the Rehnquist Court, with Justices Thomas
and Scalia, to uphold voluntary self-segregation by race and sex.
D. Against Originalism; Towards a Flexible Approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment
The "New Separatists" find comfort in an originalist interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment because under such an approach "volun-
tary" segregation could be sanctioned by it. However, the arguments of
scholar Alexander Bickel undermine that position.
Alexander Bickel postulated that when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, the result in Brown was never contemplated, a point that is
not so obscure, given the doctrine in Plessy.221 He provided historical
materials to support his contention that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "was not expected in 1866 to apply to segre-
gation. '222 Because of this, the Court could have felt itself trapped in a
215. Smith, supra note 3, at 2009.
216. Id. at 2016.
217. Specifically, Malcolm X's "pre-Mecca" consciousness. See HALEY, supra note 204.
218. JULIUS LESTER, REVOLUTIONARY NOTES 37 (1969). See generally JULIUS LESTER,
LOOK OUT, WHITEYI BLACK POWER'S GON' GET YOUR MAMA! (1968).
219. Smith, supra note 3, at 2041, n.208.
220. 1 KUNJUFU, supra note 202, at 18-19; 2 KUNJUFU, supra note 202, at 1-9; 3
JAWANZA KUNJUFU, COUNTERING THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY BLACK BOYS 1-43
(1990).
221. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decisions, 69
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955).
222. Id at 64.
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dilemma: either to follow the original intent and insist that it was power-
less to overturn segregation in any form, or to go "counter to what it
took to be the original understanding, and [to] formulat[e], as it has not
often needed to do in the past, an explicit theory rationalizing such a
course." 223 Bickel explained how the Court circumvented the trap:
"The Court, of course, made neither choice. It was able to avoid the
dilemma because the record of history, properly understood, left the way
open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material state
of the nation in 1954, not 1866. "1224
Curiously, Bickel did not refer here to Chief John Marshall's theory
of constitutional interpretation set forth with such majesty in McCulloch
v. Maryland,225 but that theory is implicit in Bickel's conclusion, with its
rejection of the originalist doctrine. Bickel's hermeneutics, like Justice
Marshall's, allows for a living and breathing Constitution that can adapt
to changing circumstances so the Court can give a decision based on the
moral and material state of the nation at the time of the case and not the
time of the adoption of the Constitution or the amendments to it.226
Given this rationale, presumably the "meaning" of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could change again. But should
it? If Bickel is right, any change would depend on changes in circum-
stances in the "moral and material state of the nation" in the future, and
not as understood at the time of prior interpretations.
IX. New Life for Brown and New Hope for Integrated Schools
and an Integrated Society
A. Recent School Desegregation Decisions
This section discusses the more recent progeny of Brown and dem-
onstrates that these cases do not erode the continuing vitality of Brown,
even though they call for a more realistic assessment of the efforts of the
school systems to eradicate segregation. Integration has not been aban-
doned. Rather, it has been adapted to a new context in which allegations
of bad faith by school boards must be supported by additional evidence
evaluating current practices, as opposed to simply relying on findings
from decades past. The original goals of integrated schools and an inte-
grated society still have considerable support, as evidenced by new forms
223. Id. at 65.
224. Id.
225. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
226. But see his later work, ALEXANDER BicKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS 11-42 (1970) (becoming increasingly suspicious of the idea of progress in consti-
tutional interpretation).
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of litigation in state courts. Pluralism also continues to be a dynamic
force, with diversity in education made possible through various private
options.
As the New Separatists press their arguments, the legacy of Brown
continues to assert itself in some key Supreme Court decisions. In Free-
man v. Pitts,2 27 the Court affirmed that "[t]he school district bears the
burden of showing that any current [racial] imbalance is not traceable, in
a proximate way, to the prior violation," '2 2 8 and held additionally that a
court may relinquish control over a former de jure school system in an
incremental manner.2 29 The principles set forth in the case are of
profound significance for the desegregation process. As the Freeman
Court stated, "once state-enforced school segregation is shown to have
existed in a jurisdiction in 1954, there arises a presumption... that any
current racial imbalance is the product of that violation. '230
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,231 the Court, in
underscoring the equitable nature of the desegregation decree and in in-
dicating that the term "unitary" has no magical import, required the dis-
trict court to consider whether the school board "had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered and whether ves-
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practica-
ble."'232 The establishment of the good faith compliance test in Dowell
has had resounding significance for school boards, including the most
recent decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,233 the latest of
the Brown progeny and heir to the legacy of Earl Warren and Kenneth
Clark.
In this most recent Brown case, the district court concluded that the
school system had achieved unitary status and was entitled to relief from
judicial oversight in the remedial phase of school desegregation litiga-
tion.234 The court therefore required the plaintiffs to make a new show-
ing of discriminatory intent rather than requiring the school district to
prove that any current racial imbalance was not causally connected to
the prior de jure segregated school system.235 Relying on Dowell and
Freeman (and giving those decisions creative interpretations), the Court
227. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
228. Id at 1447.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
232. 1d; See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992).
233. 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992).
234. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II, the implementation
decision).
235. Brown, 978 F.2d 585.
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of Appeals reversed.236
The Tenth Circuit court did not consider itself imprisoned by rigid
doctrines in combatting the evils of segregation. The court interpreted
Dowell to mean that the simple creation of a "unitary" school system did
not indicate that the problem was solved. The court refused to "treat
unitariness as a rigid concept" and explained that "Dowell does not mark
a retreat from the principle that '[t]he measure of any desegregation plan
is its effectiveness.' "237 In addressing itself to the abolition of de jure
segregation as required by law, the court asserted:
The Supreme Court's cases charge school boards that once oper-
ated school systems segregated by law with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary sys-
tem in which racial discrimination would be eliminated. Here, as
we made clear in our initial opinion, the question is whether To-
peka has successfully discharged the duty imposed by the Constitu-
tion to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation.
Both Dowell and Freeman address the means by which a
school system may be discharged from the active supervision of the
courts. In Dowell, the court required the district court to consider
whether the school board had complied in good faith with the de-
segregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.
Freeman expanded on this requirement by explicitly stating that a
federal court in a school desegregation case has the discretion to
order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its supervision and
control, thereby allowing a school system to achieve compliance in
one facet of its operations before it has fulfilled the whole of its
affirmative duty. Neither Dowell nor Freeman suggests that the
plaintiffs in the remedial phase of school desegregation litigation
must make a new showing of discriminatory intent in order to ob-
tain relief from a current condition of segregation.238
Remarkable organic (non-governmental)239 anti-discriminatory de-
velopments contributed to alleviating some of the segregation in Topeka,
where the school board did very little to desegregate its student assign-
ment practices. Contrary to the general assumption about housing pat-
terns in America, in Topeka, "increasing residential integration actually
helped to decrease racial segregation in some of the city's neighborhood
schools.'"' In such a situation, the existence of any trace of the old de
jure segregation would be highly suspect, giving support to the conclu-
236. Id.
237. Brown, 978 F.2d at 588.
238. Id at 589.
239. See CLINTON RossITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 29 (1956) ("The essence of
conservatism is the feeling for the possibilities and limits of natural, organic change.").
240. Brown, 978 F.2d at 588-89.
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sion in Freeman that if state-enforced school segregation is shown to
have existed in 1954, a presumption arises that whatever current racial
imbalance exists is the product of the original constitutional violation, a
presumption that was not afforded to the plaintiffs by the district court.
Moreover, at the time of the trial, the Topeka school system operated a
number of "racially identifiable schools," imposing on it the "substantial
burden of demonstrating the absence of a causal connection between any
current condition of segregation and the prior de jure system."241 Unless
and until that burden is met, "the district court must retain some mea-
sure of supervision over the school system."242
The district court had disregarded Topeka's history of inaction,
lending credibility to the argument of the New Separatists that Brown
lacks authority as a force for social change. The district court had con-
cluded that Topeka had achieved "unitary status," and based this con-
clusion on its belief that "the district's conduct over 30 years did not
indicate a desire to perpetuate segregation. 24 3 But the Court of Appeals
recognized that the path to hell can be paved with good intentions, or the
absence of bad ones. The mere lack of identifiably discriminatory action
or intent during that period of time was not enough by itself to "demon-
strate the lack of a causal connection between the prior de jure system
and the present system." 2"
This portion of the decision raises serious questions about the valid-
ity of AMBSs because of the ambiguous nature of de facto as opposed to
de jure segregation. The court observed,
The lesson of Freeman is that demographic changes may pro-
duce racially identifiable schools in a district that has fulfilled its
affirmative duty. What matters is whether current racial iden-
tifiability is a vestige of a school system's de jure past, or only a
product of demographic changes outside the school district's con-
trol. If the current condition is a vestige, then the school system
has not fulfilled its affirmative duty.245
The irony is that the school district's repeated insistence that its var-
ious decisions were not motivated by "racial animus" was, in all
probability, true. But as the court, which expressed its belief in the dis-
trict's sincerity, concluded, "the innovative character of the school sys-
tem by the time of trial suggests a genuine commitment to providing
quality education to all its students. The district court thought such a
241. Id. at 590.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 590-91.
244. Id. at 591.
245. Id.
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showing sufficient. As a matter of law, it was not."'
The Tenth Circuit court's commitment to results is compelling. Its
insistence that on remand the district court evaluate the "good faith" of
the school district was not empty. The decision required the district
court to base its evaluation on "objective criteria." The court's concern
was with the real possibility of resegregation after a declaration of
unitariness, and it insisted that "[s]pecific policies, decisions, and courses
of action that extend into the future must be examined to assess the
school system's good faith."247 The court summed up:
the evaluation of the "good faith" prong of the Dowell test must
include consideration of a school system's continued commitment
to integration. A school system that views compliance with a
school desegregation plan as a means by which to return to student
assignment practices that produce numerous racially identifiable
schools cannot be said to be acting in "good faith."
The inquiry into Topeka's good faith, like the inquiry into
whether further remedial efforts are necessary, must consider
whether Topeka has taken affirmative steps in the direction of de-
segregation so as to establish a "consistent pattern of lawful con-
duct." A comprehensive plan, adopted and followed by the school
board, aimed at eliminating the vestiges of segregation to the sys-
tem would be evidence of good faith; so might a school board reso-
lution declaring... [an] intention to comply with the Constitution
in the future, but only if coupled with affirmative efforts across
time. As we have observed above, inaction in the face of the af-
firmative duty to desegregate is not lawful conduct. A school sys-
tem that does not take the required steps cannot be found in good
faith and may not be discharged from continued supervision with
respect to any facet of its operations.248
B. The Significance of the Most Recent Brown Decision
The ramifications of this latest Brown decision are considerable.
Consider the pressures on a hypothetical school district by New Separa-
tist blacks calling for establishment of an all-male black school with an
Afrocentric curriculum and black male teachers. If in the past, school
assignment was part of a system of segregation that was accomplished
not by legislation but by conspiracy, and this legacy of de jure segrega-
tion continued until court supervision required that it be halted, coopera-
tion with those calling for the AMBSs would constitute unlawful action.
If the segregation is simply de facto, there is little pressure to rectify it.
246. lId
247. Id at 592.
248. Id
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In Swann v. Mecklenburg Board of Education,249 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court holding that there is no affirmative duty to cure
racial imbalance in the situation of de facto segregation, stating
"[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally re-
quired to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of stu-
dent bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished."25 0 But this statement is misleading; even if the "affirma-
tive duty to desegregate" has been "accomplished," and there is no
longer a dual system, there is still the requirement that affirmative steps
be taken, in good faith, to eliminate all traces of it, as the Supreme Court
in Dowell and Freeman explained, and as the court in the most recent
Brown decision so artfully concluded.
The impression one gets from the arguments of the New Separatists
is that they would sooner be done with the contest over de jure segrega-
tion, to relegate it to 1954, and move on. They would consider as de
facto segregation everything following the formal steps to close down the
dual system established by law (foimally or informally). As long as there
is a symbolic "unitary" system, the best thing that could happen is for
the courts to leave it alone so they can have the opportunity to create
their own brand of separation-AMBSs-under the auspices of black
control. They would still have to demonstrate that they were in compli-
ance with those doctrines dealing with gender, but leave race to the "nat-
ural" housing patterns, which have produced totally black school
districts.
Apart from the reality that de jure segregation and de facto segrega-
tion are not always easily distinguished,251 the introduction of such re-
forms as the "Afrocentric curriculum" and all-male black faculty is
bound to be a factor in driving away whites, leading to the paradox that
these measures could be seen as evidence of a failure to abolish all traces
of the once de jure segregated system. The school district could find it-
self in the uncomfortable situation of being denounced by the New Sepa-
ratists if they don't approve the AMBSs, and found in violation of a
desegregation order by the court if they do. School segregation ostensi-
bly resulting from a "voluntary" housing pattern may not be insulated
from constitutional challenge.
The approach of the court in the recent Brown decision offered an
interpretation of both Freeman and Dowell that made it premature to
249. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
250. Id. at 31-32.
251. See Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating
that there is "no difference between de facto and de jure segregation").
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sound the death knell for integrated schools. It is an interpretation that
rings true, making it harder for racial complacency to prevail. If there
can be no constitutional challenge to segregated schools that are caused
by supposedly "voluntary" housing patterns, then the spirit of Brown
compels this society to ask how "voluntary" those patterns are. Brown is
not mere legal precedent. It is a powerful symbol of what author Rich-
ard Klugar called "simple justice." '252
C. The Cultural Legacy of Brown
The Warren Court undertook to remedy in Brown the bigotry of two
centuries, to give not only to blacks but whites as well, a sense of justice
and the conviction that the constitutional process and the institution of
judicial review were somehow validated on a higher level than mere law.
That the decision was 9 to 0 was not lost on the country. In its wake
came the rush that is known as the Civil Rights Movement: the Mont-
gomery bus boycott, the sit-ins, the Freedom Riders, the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,253 including public accommodations and Title VII outlawing
discrimination in employment, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.254 The
legislative flurry ended with the watered-down open housing legislation
enacted in 1967.255 The death toll was considerable, lest it ever be be-
lieved that this process was somehow pristine and responsive.256 But as
the movement for racial justice waned in America, the escalation of the
war in Vietnam produced a backlash against the power of the federal
government, as many of the same liberals who had argued for broad leg-
islative and judicial power as mechanisms to achieve social justice now
joined with others to attack what they saw as the encroachment of gov-
ernment on the lives of the people.257 With the assassinations of Robert
252. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); See Nat Hentoff, Simple
Justice and How It Got Lost, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 10, 1992, at 26-27.
253. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
254. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1976).
255. For an analysis of the consequences of Brown, see Kenneth B. Clark, Racial Justice in
Education: Continuing Struggle in a New Era, 23 How. L. J. 93, 95 (1980) [hereinafter Clark,
Racial Justice].
256. For an account of the killings of civil rights workers James Chaney, Andrew Good-
man, and Michael Schwerner, as well as the shooting of Viola Liuzzo, see CAGIN AND DRAY,
WE ARE NOT AFRAID (1988). For an account of the murder of Medgar Evers as well as Dr.
King, see GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 269-70, 623-24 (1986).
257. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (challenging the legality of the
Vietnam war. The author was a member of the team of Constitutional Lawyers' Committee on
Undeclared Wars that submitted a lengthy amicus brief in this case). The Vietnam War actu-
ally split the liberals with Johnson, Humphrey, Robert Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy and
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Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the energy of liberalism in
America dissipated and disenchantment set in.
The constitutional process cannot be understood apart from these
events because they led to the election by a narrow margin of Richard
Nixon, whose first item on the agenda was reversing the direction of the
Supreme Court. Although his first two nominees were rejected by the
Senate and his third eventually became a moderate (Harrold Carswell
and Clement Hainesworth were defeated; Harry Blackmun was con-
firmed), Nixon did succeed in elevating William Rehnquist to the Court.
Had Justice Abe Fortas not been forced to resign and had Justice Arthur
Goldberg refused Lyndon Johnson's appointment as Ambassador to the
United Nations, the makeup of the Court would have been remarkably
different. The Reagan-Bush era, really an extension of the Nixon-Ford
era, with Carter squeezed in between as a reaction to Watergate, sealed
the fate of the Court for years to come.2 58
D. Reacting to a Backward Looking Court
Constitutional scholarship has become medieval in its attempt to
narrow and distinguish decisions by the Reagan-Bush Court that further
erode the rights of individuals, to the point that one is reminded of Lin-
coln's attempt to narrow the impact of the Dred Scott259 decision. He
argued that it was a legal decision "in favor of Dred Scott's master and
against Dred Scott and his family." 2" But unlike Douglas, "who would
make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of
governments," he, Lincoln, "would not. By resisting it as a political rule,
I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." '261
Lincoln's posture here is like that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who
wrote: "A tyrannical law, through not being accorded to reason, is not a
law, absolutely speaking but rather a perversion of law .... The like are
acts of violence rather than laws; because as Augustine says, a law that is
not just, seems to be no law at all. Wherefore such laws do not bind in
conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or distur-
George McGovern on differing sides. This split destroyed the Great Society coalition, which
never regained power. See RICHARD CUMMINGS, THE PIED PIPER PIPES; ALLARD K. LOw-
ENSTEIN AND THE LIBERAL DREAM (1985).
258. With the retirement of Justice Byron White, President Clinton has the opportunity to
alter this to some extent.
259. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
260. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in debate against Douglas, Springfield, July 17, 1858, in 2
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
261. Id.
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bance. ,,262 Lincoln, like the neo-Thomist Dr. King, saw certain
Supreme Court decisions, those that were tyrannical or unjust, as non-
binding in the broader sense. King was prepared to go to jail when he
decided to break the law as a matter of conscience. Lincoln, it would
appear, was prepared to take on the Court politically, to challenge the
doctrine of judicial supremacy to a greater extent even than Roosevelt
during the New Deal when he tried to pack the Court.
Brown enabled the country to avoid a political crisis of monumental
proportions at a time when both the executive and legislative branches
were paralyzed and held ransom to the forces of reaction. The principles
the unanimous Warren Court enunciated with regard to racial segrega-
tion, in conjunction with the empirical evidence rose above the level of
constitutional interpretation to that of true natural law, setting a stan-
dard for judicial integrity that had not been matched before, nor has it
been since.263 It is cruel irony that the New Separatists wish now to
jettison Brown and leave it to the junkheap of history as some relic from
the distant past.
X. Additional Perspectives on AMBSs in the Context of
Kenneth Clark's Vision; The New Separatism versus
the New Integration
That Kenneth Clark was able to contribute to the Brown court's
enlightenment makes him worthy of further inquiry with regard to the
question of all-male black schools. He has written:
The decision in Brown v. Board of Education, like most of the great
documents in man's continuous struggle for justice and humanity,
was a simple, direct and eloquent statement of a moral truth. In
spite of the attempts on the part of some legal purists and some
neo-conservative intellectuals to disparage the significance of this
decision, there are reasons to believe that future historians will
rank Brown with such documents as the Magna Carta, the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Emancipation Proclamation.
These documents have in common the fact that they are indicative
of the unique capacity of the human organism to formulate moral
goals and to aspire to levels of social sensitivity and humanity. It is
my personal belief that man's capacity for this moral quest differ-
entiates him from animals and helps him to check those more
primitive impulses and cruelties which threaten the survival of our
262. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part of the Second Part, Treatise on
Law, Question 92, Reply Obj. 4; Question 95, Fourth Article.
263. The Court's historical role in Brown will be fully documented in the forthcoming
volume, MAX LERNER, GREAT JUDGES, GREAT CASES--DISPATCHES FROM THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL BATrLEFiELD (Richard Cummings ed., forthcoming 1993).
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264species.
Notwithstanding the fact that Clark has perceived the decision in
Brown to be fundamentally a moral one on the level of pure reason, he
has also comprehended the reality of the decision's nature as an Ameri-
can legal phenomenon,2 65 a duality to which Clark's critic, Edmond
Cahn, did not address himself.2 66 Because of this insight, Clark has also
been able to see that the introduction of empirical sociological and psy-
chological evidence is addressed to the mundane, legal aspect of the deci-
sion,267 the roots of which go back to Brandeis, who first perceived the
relevance of social science data to constitutional disputes.268 In a reac-
tion against the rigid case method of the American legal system (and
American legal education), Justice Brandeis, "more of a legal and social
activist, expressed the revolt in a characteristic type of decision (origi-
nally the 'Brandeis brief') which sought to keep the law abreast of social
progress and found in history, economics and statistics the envelope of
social reality within which the meaning of a case was contained. 2 69
In this spirit, psychologist Dr. Kenneth Clark and his wife, Dr. Ma-
mie Clark, did research on the effects of segregation on black school chil-
dren as well as on white children,27° research that had its impact on the
Court in Brown.271 The strategy worked in demolishing "the bland as-
sertion in Plessy that enforced separation of the races in no way was in-
tended to make blacks inferior. '272
The Court's assertion, that the psychological evidence at the time of
Brown (that segregation in schools was harmful to black children) sup-
planted whatever the extent of psychological knowledge was available
about the effects of segregation at the time of Plessy, led the Court to
264. Clark, Racial Justice, supra note 255, at 93.
265. See id.
266. See Calm, supra note 35; see Kenneth Clark, The Desegregation Cases, supra note 35,
at 227-35.
267. See id. at 228-30.
268. MAX LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 428 (Henry Holt) (1957).
269. Id at 429. Lerner also described the opposition of Justices Holmes, Pound, Cardozo,
Frank, and Arnold to the rigidity of the case method that was introduced first at Harvard
during the period of Professors Langdell and Ames.
270. See Hentoff, supra note 252 at 26-27.
271. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11, citing Kenneth B. Clark, Effect
of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House Con-
ference on Children and Youth, 1950). For other works by Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P.
Clark on the impact of segregation, see Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identifi-
cation and Preference in Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (3rd ed. Holt
1947); Kenneth B. Clark, Desegregation of the American Public Schools, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN HUMAN RELATIONS EDUCATION (1955);
KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (2d ed. Beacon 1955).
272. Hentoff, supra note 252, at 26.
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conclude, that "[a]ny language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this find-
ing is rejected." '273 The Court's description of the effects of segregation
was "amply supported by modem authority." '274 The question now is
whether this authority is still "modem" or whether new evidence man-
dates a fresh examination of the situation of minorities in the American
education system, forcing a change in the premise about race and educa-
tion that had been accepted as immutable in 1954.
Dr. Clark argues that the methods and findings of his studies sup-
porting the Brown decision remain valid.275 Further, in anticipating the
argument in Freeman that organically created neighborhood patterns
that produce de facto segregated schools are not subject to law suits on
the grounds that segregation is unconstitutional, Clark asserted:
The method of litigation which seemed so effective in dealing with
problems of racial inequity in the schools and other aspects of life
in the southern states do not seem particularly effective in dealing
with the more sophisticated defacto forms of school segregation in
northern cities. It remains a fact that segregated schools in the
North are as damaging to human beings as were the dejure segre-
gated schools of the South. Children who are required to attend
these racially segregated, inferior and stigmatized schools in north-
ern cities are being subjected to forms of educational genocide
which "may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone." '276
Clark perceived the argument that distinguished between de facto
and de jure segregation as essentially a "hoax" perpetrated by white
northern racist education officials to justify urban segregation.277 He did
not anticipate it being used by African-American New Separatists on be-
half of all-male black schools in a movement that has made its way into
the educational and political mainstream.
273. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
274. Id.
275. See Clark, The Desegregation Cases, supra note 35. Clark refers specifically to "the
use of the 'Dolls Test' (actual dolls, not pictures of dolls, were used in this research) on some of
the plaintiffs," which was used "to determine whether the general findings from the larger
number of Negro children who had been tested years before were true also for the children
who were the actual plaintiffs in these cases. The decision to test some of these plaintiffs was a
legal one made by the lawyers of the NAACP. It was their assumption as lawyers that general
scientific findings would have more weight in a courtroom if it could be demonstrated that they
also applied in the specific cases and for the particular plaintiffs before the court. When these
plaintiff children were tested and interviewed by this writer, it was his judgment that some of
these children showed evidence of the same type of personality damage related to racial preju-
dice, segregation, and discrimination which was found in the larger number of subjects who
were studied in the original, published research. This opinion was presented to the courts in
the form of sworn testimony." Id.
276. Clark, Racial Justice, supra note 255, at 100, (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 494).
277. See id. at 99-100.
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Following the result in the Garrett decision, Michigan Rep. Hansen
Clarke, (D-Detroit), introduced legislation to allow the establishment of
single-sex alternative public schools in Michigan. His bills would remove
legal obstacles cited in Garrett that halted operation of the alternative
schools in Detroit.2 78 His argument is essentially the one resorted to by
all of the New Separatists: the inner-cities schools are de facto, not de
jure segregated as the result of housing and community patterns and
hence the rationale of Brown does not apply. The creation of AMBSs is
permissible because inner-city African-American males are threatened
with extinction and have a history of severe difficulties that African-
American females do not have, giving rise to acceptable discrimination
under the intermediate scrutiny standard of Hogan.279
Michael Meyers, executive director of the New York Civil Rights
Coalition, opposed this reasoning through arguments similar to those of
Kenneth Clark.280 He reminded us that "[t]o aid the fight against racial
separation in public facilities, the 1964 Civil Rights Act made it illegal
for a public school or government-sponsored program to separate per-
sons on the flimsy basis of skin color."'28 ' Here, the New Separatists rely
on Freeman and the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation.
Moreover, they counter with the point that the Male Academies in De-
troit, for example, do not exclude anybody on the basis of race, religion,
or nationality and that everyone is encouraged to apply, provided that
person is male.282 It could be argued with considerable justification that,
notwithstanding such superficial compliance with the outlawing of de
jure segregation by race, the clear communication that these schools are
to have an "Afrocentric" curriculum and are to be staffed with all-male
black teachers is a signal to non-blacks not to apply. A court in such an
instance should pierce the "de facto" segregation veil to uncover a defi-
nite de jure policy of segregation by race, not only by sex, to which the
standard of strict scrutiny should apply. In education cases, the applica-
ble principle is the rule of Brown that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. 28
3
278. See Representative Hanson Clarke, Should states support single-sex, black schools? -
Point; Counterpoint, STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, Jan. 1992, at 16. Compare the Minneapolis
"academy" (co-educational) with the Seattle "academy" (all-male).
279. Id. at 16-17.
280. Michael Meyers, Should states support single-sex black schools?-Counterpoint, STATE
GOVERNMENT NEWS, Jan. 1992 at 16-17.
281. Id.; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
282. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
283. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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Meyers, in his argument against the AMBSs, makes numerous sali-
ent points that underlie the legal problems:
Such schools are not dedicated to free inquiry and critical thought,
but to indoctrination and ideological programming. Often organ-
ized around the seven principles of Kwanza, these schools drill stu-
dents to support such ideological concepts as "racial unity" and
"faith in racial and political leaders." Schools, however, should
stimulate critical thinking, not blind faith. Education should
broaden students' horizons, not isolate them culturally.2" 4
Referring to the supporters of these schools as "self-styled black nation-
alists," Meyers pointed to the "cultural balkanization" that separate
schools for minorities will lead to:
An officially balkanized public school system would not stop with
separate schools for black boys but extend to black girls. Puerto
Rican boys and girls, and so on. When will we realize that not all
blacks are like or, for that matter, share the same culture? Simi-
larly, Hispanics, Asians and whites also represent diverse cultures
and experiences.285
Meyers accepted the sincerity of "minority advocates of segrega-
tion" "who really believe there is something different about black males."
But he rejected their analysis that the special nature of black males in
American society is the cause of "their high dropout rates, teen father-
hood, crime and imprisonment rates" finding it simplistic and "old-fash-
ioned racism" based on a pejorative stereotype.286 If he is right, and
there is considerable reason to suspect that he is, then the argument in
favor of all-male schools based on Hogan falls apart. Justice O'Connor
made it clear that any discrimination based on gender is unacceptable.
"Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions, '287 she asserted for the Court.
"Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or
to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." '288 This would
make it almost impossible for the proponents of the AMBSs to meet the
burden of heightened scrutiny that gender discrimination mandates by
providing a showing of an "'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification." 2 9
284. Meyers, supra note 280, at 16-17.
285. Id at 17.
286. Id.
287. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
288. Id.
289. Id at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)); Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
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Meyers asserted, "[t]he all-male black school concept is paternalistic
and sexist. It stigmatizes boys, ignores girls and brazenly disqualifies wo-
men as capable teachers of boys. In the minds of these mystics, only men
can teach boys to become 'men."' 2 90 He also warned: "Black parents
who are concerned about their children's education and future should
reject separatism. Moreover, unless our society is prepared to totally de-
segregate, we will continue to veer away from an integrated society and
divide into racially separate and unequal parts." '29 1
Even as the debate around the AMBS rages,2 92 the theories of sepa-
ration show signs of stimulating a new integrationist theory in which the
separate components become the very instruments for the end to frag-
mentation. In this context, the long neglected state constitutions are be-
ing examined as possible vehicles for filling the gaps the Rehnquist Court
has been creating, with its distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation.293
A Connecticut suit attacking the racially isolated public schools of
Hartford, Sheffv. O'Neill,294 was originally filed in 1988 and has survived
two state attempts to kill it on the grounds that there was no constitu-
tional violation and that the social and economic conditions underlying
segregation were beyond the scope of the court. The suit asks the Con-
necticut Superior Court to rule that segregated conditions, whatever
their cause, "violate the Connecticut Constitution's guarantee of equal
educational opportunity. '295
The chances of success on the state level are enhanced in Connecti-
cut because, unlike the Federal Constitution, under which there is no
fundamental right to an education, 296 the state's constitution provides for
free public education and guarantees equal opportunity regardless of
290. Meyers, supra note 280, at 17.
291. Id.
292. See, eg., Jones, supra note 6, at 12; Michael Meyers, Separate is Not Equal, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 1992, at A19; Michael Meyers, Black Racism at Taxpayer Expense, WALL ST.
J., July 30, 1991, at A16; Whitaker, Do Black Males Need Special Schools?, EBONY, 1991 at 17;
Houpper, Separatist But Equal?, VILLAGE VOICE, May 19, 1992, at 27; Moody, The New
Segregation, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Nov. 6, 1991, at 44. For a general discussion on disintegrat-
ing race relations in the United States, see TAYLOR, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS (1992).
293. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). See also Bernard James and Julie M.
Hoffman, Brown in State Hands: State Policymaking and Educational Equity After Freeman
v. Pitts, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (published in this issue, 1993)
294. 609 A.2d 1072. See George Judson, Lawsuit Attacks the Segregation of Urban Schools
From White Suburbs, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1992, at 48L.
295. Id.
296. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)).
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race.2 97 The plaintiffs in the suit, the families of seventeen black, His-
panic, and white children from Hartford and West Hartford, argue that
"victory could lead to a new era of school desegregation in northern
states like Connecticut, where schools have become segregated not by
law, but because minority groups are concentrated in a handful of cit-
ies."'298 If the suit is successful, it will have triumphed over the de jure-de
facto dichotomy. Even when segregation is not intentional, it would be
unconstitutional because it leads to unequal systems. As a pre-trial
memorandum for the plaintiffs stated, "this court should not hold an-
other generation hostage to the state's good intentions. 299
How good these intentions are remains to be seen. Whatever the
outcome of the trial, there will almost certainly be an appeal, with the
state attempting to prevent the integration of the suburban schools. Such
a response would give credence to Kenneth Clark's expressed fears about
the white northern Board officials in New York who with "Orwellian
logic, ... stated that it was and remains its policy to encourage quality
integrated education," while in the same pronouncement, "ordered the
exclusion of minority group children from predominantly white schools,
to better realize the original objective of quality integrated education." 3"
It is not for nothing that Michael Meyers' language parallels that of
Clark's in his criticism of the AMBS:
It is now desirable rather than racist to segregate children on the
basis of race. It is now realistic rather than sexist to match male
teachers with male students. What utter nonsense and Orwellian
doubletalk. But that is what some educators and community activ-
ists are urging us to accept. More stereotyping. More racism.
More sexism. More distractions from the purposes and goals of
American democratic education.30 1
Both Clark and Meyers have targeted the groups that could form a
powerful coalition against the new integrationism; the white school offi-
cials in the North and the African-American New Separatists. The State
297. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (guaranteeing equal rights regardless of race) and art. 8 § 1
(guaranteeing public education).
298. Judson, supra note 294.
299. Id. The state, through its experts, is prepared to make the following arguments:
"That desegregation has not significantly affected the achievement of black studentsL] that
most differences in school performance between Hartford and its suburbs are due to family
background and economic status, not race[] that most people in the Hartford area live where
they do by choice, not because of discriminationL;] that minority groups in Connecticut cities
do not believe integration is necessary for quality educationL;] and that in any case, minority
groups are moving to Hartford's suburbs at an increasing rate, achieving integration them-
selves." Id.
300. Clark, Racial Justice, supra note 255, at 99-100.
301. Meyers, supra note 280, at 17.
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of Connecticut has shown as much by formulating "a much stricter de-
fense against integration itself," including testimony from "minority
groups in Connecticut cities" who "do not believe integration is neces-
sary for quality education."30 2 How far we have come from Brown.
What is needed to resolve these constitutional antinomes is a syn-
thetic jurisprudence, in the Hegelian sense.30 3 Brown is not a sterile and
bland resolution of the segregation dilemma. There is nothing in the
doctrine that separate can never be equal that negates the value of cul-
tural integrity or that mandates ethnic assimilation. The same Constitu-
tion that protects educational opportunity protects multicultural
diversity. Moreover, the existence of free choice provides ample oppor-
tunity to create the sort of private institutions that the New Separatists
advocate. No one dictates to the Yeshivas3°  what their curriculum
should be or that the teachers cannot all be male rabbis, or that the stu-
dents should not be all male. But they do not do these things with the
taxpayers' money.3 °5
302. See Judson, supra note 294.
303. According to Hegel:
In the attempt which reason makes to comprehend the unconditional nature of the
world, it falls into what are called Antinomes. In other words it maintains two oppo-
site propositions about the source object, and in such a way that each of them has to
be maintained with equal necessity .... [They appear in all objects of every kind, in
all conceptions, notions and ideas. For the property thus indicated is what we shall
afterwards describe as the Dialectical influence in logic .... That true and positive
meaning of the antinomes is this: that every actual thing involves a coexistence of
opposed elements. Consequences to know, or, in equivalent to being conscious of it
as a concrete unity of opposed determinations.
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILO-
SOPHICAL SCIENCES 97-100 (William Wallace trans., 2d ed. 1892). Thus, Hegelian logic in-
volves the synthesis of these antinomes, or opposites. Universality is reached in the "line of
activity" following "the three 'moments' of the notion which ... is the specific or definite
notion of understanding. The reception of the object into the forms of this notion is the Syn-
thetic Method." Id. at 366. The popular conception of the Hegelian process is summarized in
the phrase, "Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis." For a critique and criticism of Hegelian logic, see
KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 105 (C.J. Arthur ed. 1970).
304. Yeshivas are Orthodox Jewish religious schools in which the curriculum is based on
the Talmud, the Jewish religious code. Private, all-black Christian academies have been estab-
lished with an Afrocentric curriculum packaged
from one of the four publishers that produced the books for the white Southern
Christian schools established to resist school integration in the early 1970's.... In
interviews with more than a dozen administrators of black Christian schools, practi-
cally every educator acknowledged a white-orientated, if not racist slant in the tradi-
tional Christian school curriculum.
David J. Dent, 4 Mixed Message in Black Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, § 4A at 28.
305. But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), on the problems of tax
exempt status for private schools with racially discriminatory admissions standards on the
basis of religious doctrine under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
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In the final analysis, there is in the critique of Brown a refinement of
our comprehension of what it means to have a constitutional system in
the ultimate sense. The poet Carl Sandburg once said that the Civil War
was fought over a verb; the United States are or the United States is.
When one looks at Lebanon, or Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet Union,
one is in further awe of those who gave us our Constitution as the vehicle
for creating a great nation. But perhaps it was the renowned African
American folksinger and guitarist, Leadbeily, who said it best:
"We're in the same boat, brother,
We're in the same boat, brother.
And if you tip one end,
You're gonna rock the other.
We're in the same boat, brother. 3 °6
§ 501(c)(3) and the granting of charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under
§ 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170.
306. For essentially the same message in a more formal context, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The destinies of the two races [are] indissolutely
linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanctions of law.").
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